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Fighting Insurgents in the Information Age: UK and US doctrine in Iraq
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intensity war and their adaptability to novel challenges for which they do not seem,
crucially, to have adequate training or doctrine.
36
Yet, in doing so they also emphasise,
and this has been reported by a number of sources, the great diversity of approaches by
different American commanders, some closer to a ‘British’ kind of approach and others
more attritional. This does pose problems in terms of creating order, which is also an
exercise in managing expectations.
36
R. M. Cassidy, ‘Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly’, Military Review, (Sep.-Oct. 2000), p.41
quotes general Shinseki commenting on his own experience in Bosnia that: ‘ “there wasn’t a clear doctrinefor stability operations”’. This was even less so for COIN. See also ‘US Military Doctrine andCounterinsurgency’, IISS, Strategic Survey 2003/4 : An Evaluation and Forecasting of World Affairs,(Oxford : OUP/IISS, 2004), maxime pp. 42-48. It mentions that Army schools ‘devoted almost noclassroom time to “foreign internal defence” (FID), the new and presumably less politically charged termfor counterinsurgency.’ And that the ‘“capstone” field manual, Operations virtually ignored […] nontraditional military missions.’ That the Operations 2001 devotes only 2 of 313 pages to FID. Still thesubsidiary manual Stability Operations and Support Operations does include ‘substantial detail’ and‘promulgates a sensible and sometimes sophisticated set of counter-insurgency tenets.’ It is seen as‘essentially political’ and includes reference to the need for propaganda to discredit it or addressing thecauses of the insurgents strength. The US is seen essentially in a ‘supporting role’ to local governments.There is some reference to the use of force ‘being kept to a minimum’ and quotes “military operationsdesigned for war must be modified for counterinsurgency’ and they ‘must complement and reinforcepolitical, social and economic reforms.’
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19
intensity war and their adaptability to novel challenges for which they do not seem,
crucially, to have adequate training or doctrine.
36
Yet, in doing so they also emphasise,
and this has been reported by a number of sources, the great diversity of approaches by
different American commanders, some closer to a ‘British’ kind of approach and others
more attritional. This does pose problems in terms of creating order, which is also an
exercise in managing expectations.
36
R. M. Cassidy, ‘Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly’, Military Review, (Sep.-Oct. 2000), p.41
quotes general Shinseki commenting on his own experience in Bosnia that: ‘ “there wasn’t a clear doctrine
for stability operations”’. This was even less so for COIN. See also ‘US Military Doctrine and
Counterinsurgency’, IISS, Strategic Survey 2003/4 : An Evaluation and Forecasting of World Affairs,
(Oxford : OUP/IISS, 2004), maxime pp. 42-48. It mentions that Army schools ‘devoted almost no
classroom time to “foreign internal defence” (FID), the new and presumably less politically charged term
for counterinsurgency.’ And that the ‘“capstone” field manual, Operations virtually ignored […] non
traditional military missions.’ That the Operations 2001 devotes only 2 of 313 pages to FID. Still the
subsidiary manual Stability Operations and Support Operations does include ‘substantial detail’ and
‘promulgates a sensible and sometimes sophisticated set of counter-insurgency tenets.’ It is seen as
‘essentially political’ and includes reference to the need for propaganda to discredit it or addressing the
causes of the insurgents strength. The US is seen essentially in a ‘supporting role’ to local governments.
There is some reference to the use of force ‘being kept to a minimum’ and quotes “military operations
designed for war must be modified for counterinsurgency’ and they ‘must complement and reinforce
political, social and economic reforms.’
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