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A Case Study: Diplomatic Communication During the Prisoner of War Crisis in South Korea in 1953
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The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Commander in Chief, United NationsCommand(Clark)
-Seoul, June 20, 1953.
Briggs wrote, in part:
show-down with Rhee over armistice seems unavoidable and
should in my opinion take place before our position vis-a-vis Koreanpeople is further weakened by Rhee’s appeal to Korean nationalism.Release of Korean anti-Communist prisoners had very widespreadsupport among ROK people, and Rhee is capitalizing on this. (FRUS XV1225-1226)
Although I am convinced Rhee’s motivation is sincere and from his
point of view patriotic, I have come to conclusion we have reachedpoint in our relations with him at which we must be prepared to takedrastic measures to remove his opposition if he does not give in, orelse let Rhee win ball game. (FRUS XV 1226).
Briggs’ point about nationalism and support of the Korean people for the prisoner releasemust have made some impression on the U.S. leadership. In addition, U.S. officials didnot want to see growing disfavor among the South Korean people toward the UnitedStates. This was, indeed, a very sensitive time for the United States and the UnitedNations. And yet, Briggs’call for “drastic measures” points to the potentially seriouspossibility of the need for U.S. and UNC authorities to implement Everready. Lookingback, that most certainly is what Briggs was considering.
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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for FarEastern Affairs (Johnson)
-[Washington,] June 22, 1953.
This memorandum mentions that about “8,000 to 9,000” North Korean prisoners were
still held in prison camps in South Korea despite the large-scale release on June 18(FRUS XV 1235). In addition, according to the memorandum, Johson said that “somefiring had taken place between South Korean and UN troops.” (FRUS XV 1235). Shotsfired by allies at fellow allies raises a matter of the utmost importance--would the SouthKorea-U.S. alliance break apart? Further, would UN forces have to confront and disarmSouth Korean soldiers? Events did not take a turn for the worse, and the relationshipheld. Looking back, however, the fact that gunfire broke out was a matter of tremendous
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The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Commander in Chief, United Nations
Command
(Clark)
-Seoul, June 20, 1953.
Briggs wrote, in part:
show-down with Rhee over armistice seems unavoidable and
should in my opinion take place before our position vis-a-vis Korean
people is further weakened by Rhee’s appeal to Korean nationalism.
Release of Korean anti-Communist prisoners had very widespread
support among ROK people, and Rhee is capitalizing on this. (FRUS XV
1225-1226)
Although I am convinced Rhee’s motivation is sincere and from his
point of view patriotic, I have come to conclusion we have reached
point in our relations with him at which we must be prepared to take
drastic measures to remove his opposition if he does not give in, or
else let Rhee win ball game. (FRUS XV 1226).
Briggs’ point about nationalism and support of the Korean people for the prisoner release
must have made some impression on the U.S. leadership. In addition, U.S. officials did
not want to see growing disfavor among the South Korean people toward the United
States. This was, indeed, a very sensitive time for the United States and the United
Nations. And yet, Briggs’call for “drastic measures” points to the potentially serious
possibility of the need for U.S. and UNC authorities to implement Everready. Looking
back, that most certainly is what Briggs was considering.
#
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
-[Washington,] June 22, 1953.
This memorandum mentions that about “8,000 to 9,000” North Korean prisoners were
still held in prison camps in South Korea despite the large-scale release on June 18
(FRUS XV 1235). In addition, according to the memorandum, Johson said that “some
firing had taken place between South Korean and UN troops.” (FRUS XV 1235). Shots
fired by allies at fellow allies raises a matter of the utmost importance--would the South
Korea-U.S. alliance break apart? Further, would UN forces have to confront and disarm
South Korean soldiers? Events did not take a turn for the worse, and the relationship
held. Looking back, however, the fact that gunfire broke out was a matter of tremendous
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