The issue of the non-repatriate Communist prisoners being held in South Korea came
up again. Here, too, General Clark expressed concern that Rhee might still do something
on his own:
There is now more than a remote possibility he may, either covertly or
overtly, initiate action to cause the release of all Korean non-repatriates. He
has the capability, and should he attempt this action, there are few effective
steps that I can take to counter it. (FRUS XV 1098-1099).
This indeed was the step that Rhee would eventually take. Should the UNC have been
better prepared?
#
Did Rhee fully trust the sincerity of the nations under the UN flag? Or did he have
doubts?
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
-Seoul, May 25, 1953.
Briggs and Clark met again with Rhee. Briggs wrote, “President at one point declared
ROK made mistake believing democratic nations would keep faith.” (FRUS XV 1100).
As this excerpt seems to indicate, Rhee perhaps believed that his UN allies did not have
the commitment that he had counted on. Rhee, after all, sought the unification of Korea.
The United States and its allies were satisfied to end the war and to let South and North
Korea live side by side.
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The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
-Tokyo, May 26, 1953.
Clark met with Rhee and Pyun. Excerpts of Rhee’s comments from the meeting
follow:
- “Please inform Pres Eisenhower that I am not agitating against an
armistice, that it is the popular will of the people. The people will not
accept these new terms even if the government tells them to do so.”
(FRUS XV 1107).
-“We will die, we will go alone, one way or the other.” (FRUS XV 1107)
-“I cannot promise the President my military cooperation without unification of
Korea.” (FRUS XV 1108).
Convention