28
This is not to suggest that Nazarbaev was not concerned about the geo-strategic intentions of
Russian nationalists and communists. He voiced concern about Russian imperialists, but he
often reserved his sharpest comments for Western audiences. For example, during a conference
in Maastricht in late November 1993, Nazarbaev said he was concerned about the imperial
demands by “some Russian politicians” that Russia protect Russians in the near abroad. He
compared the rhetoric of some Russian politicians to that of Hitler’s in defense of Sudeten
Germans.
99
In February 1994, days before he went to Washington to seek economic assistance
in exchange for nuclear disarmament, he complained that the lack of Western economic aid for
the non-Russian former Soviet republics encouraged fascism and chauvinism in Russia.
100
The
comments undoubtedly were useful to appease opponents and skeptics of cooperation with
Russia. Yet, one should not exaggerate the importance of these proclamations. First, the
nationalist rhetoric in Russia was common throughout 1992 and 1993, so it was not new to
Nazarbaev. In April 1992, he referred to Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi as a
respected friend.
101
To others, including Estonian leaders, Rutskoi was a prototypical extreme
nationalist. Second, the results of the 1993 elections to the Russian Duma did not influence the
conception of the national identity that Nazarbaev wanted to construct. He continued to negotiate
with Russia and seek closer ties within the CIS. Third, although the Kazakh government funded
ethnic Kazakhs who wished to return, President Nazarbaev did not encourage ethnic Russians to
leave as Estonia did. Nazarbaev did not implement a decolonization fund as Estonia had.
Although ethnic tensions existed between Russians and Kazakhs, Nazarbaev wanted Russians to
stay.
Convention