48
Moroz also conceptualized Ukrainian-Russian relations in terms of mutual interdependence,
arguing that Russia needed good relations with Ukraine to improve its image to the world and the
success of Ukrainian national security goals depended on the state of relations with Russia.
197
In
general, Moroz’s conception of the national identity led him to view relations between the two
countries as one of “eternal strategic partnership” and as “brotherly.”
198
Conversely, Ukrainian
nationalists rejected the depiction of relations in terms of fraternal unity because it denied the
distinctiveness of Ukrainians.
199
Finally, Moroz consistently stated that Ukraine had to account for Russia’s interests on the
Black Sea, and he criticized politicians in both countries who exploited tensions over the fleet.
200
We should proceed first of all on the basis that the Black Sea Fleet is the
special strategic interest of Ukraine and Russia. If the fleet will be divided,
then each of us should cooperate with each other as military organs of friendly states.
201
Moroz always advocated granting Russia basing rights in Sevastopol. At first, he floated the
idea of keeping the command of the Black Sea Fleet intact. He suggested that both sides should
have command of parts of the fleet, but he wanted to maintain a unified command structure.
202
Eventually, Moroz accepted the governments plan, arguing that Russia would have to build its
own base on the Russian coast of the Black Sea if it could not share the fleet’s infrastructure in
Sevastopol.
203
He explained his vote for the ratification of the agreements by arguing that they
defended the political and economic interests of Ukraine.
204
I interviewed two deputies who were not members of Rukh, the Communist Party, or an
extreme left or right fraction in the Verkhovna Rada at the time of ratification.
205
They
represented the diversity of the accommodationist wing of Ukrainian politics. Both these
deputies argued that ideally Russia should have withdrawn, but they conceded that a compromise
with Russia was necessary. The extent to which Ukraine should have compromised is where the
Convention