58
Conclusion
The comparison of Estonia’s decision to Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’s decisions highlights
the importance of the self/other dimension of identity politics. The closer one views an “other”
to the “self,” the more likely empathy will be shown to the “other.” In the case of Estonia, the
self/other dimension was rigidly dichotomized such that the idea of Russian troops remaining
was unthinkable. Distrust or fear of Russia was embedded in the dominant conception of the
national identity embraced by virtually every ethnic Estonian political leader. Russia presented
itself as a historical menace to Estonian independence, and Russian troops symbolized a past that
had to be erased so that the country could move forward to claim its place in Europe. Thus, the
withdrawal of the troops was consistent with the view of Russia in the Estonian national identity
supported by most Estonian leaders.
The willingness to show Russia empathy existed in Ukraine and Kazakhstan because the
long historical ties with Russia minimized the impact of nominal differences of self/other for
many leaders in both countries. With the balance of national identity politics in each country
tilted toward a favorably assessment of Russia, the strategic calculation to cooperate with Russia
could be made. In the case of Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev’s support for a Russified national identity
made it possible to cooperate on the Baikonur issue in order to achieve economic gains and
possibly aid inter-ethnic stability. The Ukrainian case offers a more dynamic look at the impact
of identity politics to frame a national security agenda. The relative openness of the Ukrainian
political system made it possible to examine the competing conceptions of the national identity
in parliament. The balance of power was against those deputies who had negative views of
Russia. In sum, it was rational for Ukraine and Kazakhstan to cooperate with Russia, but it was
Convention