(Page 68 of 68) - Identity Politics and National Security Interests: Deciding the Fate of Soviet Military Assets in Estonia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine authored by Stevens, Christopher.

226

USIA, “Russians and Ukrainians Regret Demise of the USSR; Lose Confidence in NATO,” USIA Opinion

Analysis, M-28-98, February 24, 1998.

227

Ibid. The results reflect both a response of totally agree and one of agree. Total agreement in Western Ukraine

was only 43%, but the percentage was 55% in West-Central, 70% in East-Central, 77% in Southern, and 67% in
Eastern Ukraine.

228

Ibid. Support in the other two regions, east-central (71%) and the south (67%), was significantly higher than in

the west.

229

For a discussion of the debate over the new constitution, see Ustina Markus, “The Constitutional Debate in

Ukraine,” Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) Analytical Brief, April 24, 1996, and Ustina Markus, “Ukrainian
Parliament Approves New Constitution,” OMRI Analytical Brief, June 28, 1996.

230

, October 30, 1996, p. 4.

231

Author interview, Kiev, Ukraine, May 1999. I had several interviews/conversations with a staff member of the

Ukrainian National Security Council. He agreed that Yeltsin’s poor health prevented attention to the issues
concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations, allowing subordinates and his opponents to distort or derail Russia’s
official position on the fleet issue.

232

Author interview, Kiev, Ukraine, March 17, 1999.

233

Russia characterized the status of Sevastopol as “

,” but Ukraine would

only accept the conception of

. See

, June 9-16,

1996, p. 10; Agence France Presse, April 24, 1995; and Itar-Tass, July 3, 1995

234

, February 15, 1995 and June 15, 1995, p. 3. See also, Lepingwell, “The Black Sea Fleet

Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?,” pp. 48-55.

235

In February 1992, the Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution calling for a unified Black Sea Fleet and

another resolution demanding that the legality of the 1954 transfer be examined. See Lepingwell, “The Black Sea
Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?,” pp. 48-55.

236

For a discussion of these points, Simonsen, pp. 289-316.

237

During negotiations with Russia in April 1994, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev walked out of

negotiations without an explanation. The Ukrainian side denounced his behavior as unprofessional. Chornovil
denounced it as “unethical” and as a “reflection of a consistent pro-imperial policy.” See

April 26, 1994, p. 3. Even a Ukrainian Communist Party objected to Russian behavior. After Massandra, an official
accused Yeltsin and other members of the Russian delegation of making it seem as if Ukraine had capitulated. The
deputy was obviously upset that the Russian side made it difficult for Ukrainians to defend the agreement. See

, September 11, 1993.

238

To make matters worse, Russian officials often went to the Crimea to assert their claims. In December 1994,

Luzhkov traveled to Sevastopol to declare it a Russian military city that would forever be together with Russia. See

, December 28, 1994, p. 3.

239

Luzhkov proclaimed that “Sevastopol was and is a Russian city and we must defend Sevastopol’s right to remain

a Russian city…No Russian will feel comfortable until Sevastopol is returned to the Russian Federation.” See Orest
Deychakivsky, “News Analysis” Russian legislature and politicians claim Ukrainian port of Sevastopol,” The
Ukrainian Weekly, January 26, 1997.

240

, August 5, 1997.

241

, March 2, 1999, p. 4.

242

For examples, see

, July 13, 1993, p. 1, and

, October 22, 1996, p. 3.

243

See RFE/RL Daily Report, January 10, 1992.

244

The Washington Post, January 31, 1992, G 1, 5.

245

See

, January 20, 1996, p. 4.

246

, April 20, 1996, p. 5.