9
need to acquire ‘the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries including in
appropriate cases through preemptive measures’ such as destroying ‘an adversary’s
WMD assets before these weapons are used’ (Office of the President 2002b, pp.1-2).
3
In sum, the doctrine purports to justify resort to preemptive/ preventive attacks against
not just terrorists but also states that harbour them.
How is this use of force compatible with the notion of state sovereignty?
What changes in the idea of state sovereignty are implicit in the administration’s
argument?
Relatedly, such preemptive/preventive action seems to overrule the notions
of sovereign equality and non-intervention, one might be tempted to ask why and how
this overruling can be justified.
Both National Security Strategy and National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction are largely silent on this question, emphasizing
only the immediacy and magnitude of today’s threat and the limitations of the
deterrence strategy.
The Iraq War does not provide a clear clue on this point either.
The
administration’s case for the legitimacy of military action against Iraq mostly depended
upon one or a combination of three factors.
The first is Iraq’s long-standing defiance
Convention