9
the level of the tripartite Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary
Assembly, was often seen as an unnecessary delay to vital policy implementation.
These discussions created further work for the High Representative as affirmation of
international policy in these bodies nearly always required ‘prompting by, or support
from, my Office’.
37
Compared to the swift signature of the chief administrator’s pen,
the joint institutions were judged to be ‘painfully cumbersome and ineffective’.
38
The ‘cumbersome’ need to acquire the assent of elected BiH representatives was
removed when the Bonn PIC summit, in December 1997, gave the High
Representative the power to directly impose legislation, giving international officials
both executive and legislative control over the formally independent state. The OHR
was now mandated to enact ‘interim measures’ against the wishes of elected state,
entity, cantonal and municipal elected bodies. These decrees were to remain in place
until formally assented to by the respective level of government. The ‘Bonn powers’
also enabled the High Representative to dismiss elected representatives and
government officials held to be obstructing the OHR’s task of implementing the
Dayton agreement.
39
It should also be highlighted that the extended mandates laid down at Bonn were
qualitatively different from earlier extensions to the OHR’s powers: the new mandates
granted by the PIC, to itself, for the purpose of overseeing BiH were also made
indefinite.
40
International withdrawal and the ceding of sovereignty and policy-
making powers to BiH institutions was now to be dependent on an ill-defined set of
‘benchmarks’ to be determined by the PIC at a time of its own choosing.
41
Since
December
1997,
successive
High
Representatives
have
grasped
the
opportunities
unaccountable
power
has
provided.
Bildt’s
successor,
Carlos
Westendorp, explained the situation: ‘You do not [have] power handed to you on a
platter. You just seize it, if you use this power well no-one will contest it.’
42
These
arbitrary powers have been regularly used to impose legislative measures against the
will of elected bodies and to sack hundreds of BiH public officials, from members of
the Presidency and entity Prime Ministers down to municipal civil servants.
43