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schools, transportation or other goods during the struggle. These institutions and the
leaders that emerge to run them prove to be important resources once the active struggle
has subsided. “Mobilizing and maintaining a popular movement geared to nonviolent
action go hand-in-hand with strengthening a civil society and establishing or sustaining
democracy” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:7).
Ackerman and Kruegler examined six cases of nonviolent action and determined
that success does not hinge on how the opponents behave or how violent they become
(1994:322). Ackerman and Duvall note that nonviolent action has worked against every
type of oppressive opponent. “There is no correlation between the degree of violence
used against non-violent resisters and the likelihood of their eventual success. Some who
faced the greatest brutality prevailed decisively” (2000:7). In fact, these movements may
be more at risk for “benign” adversaries who make small concessions or attempt to co-opt
the movement rather than crush the movement with violent reprisals. For example, “Had
the Polish authorities resorted to wholesale torture and murder against Solidarity, they
would have immediately isolated themselves from the citizenry” (Ackerman and
Kruegler 1994: 323). In three of the six cases examined by Ackerman and Kruegler,
initial concessions were made by the militarily powerful opponent and later recanted or
withdrawn. Leaders in non-violent movements need to be wary of small concessions or
those that can be easily withdrawn, as they may weaken a movement prematurely.
Additionally, Schock refutes the argument that nonviolence only works within
democracies or when it is used against benign oppressors (2003:706). He states that the
beliefs of the oppressors are only one of many variables determining the success or
failure of nonviolent movements.
Convention