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such as occurred in Spain just before the 2004 elections. Terrorists seek to gain sympathy
from a potential constituency and/or strike fear in the hearts of the enemy audience (ibid:
387). They may also seek to compel allegiance through fear among their own
constituents. Some groups may also seek to provoke a strong reaction from the enemy
government in an attempt to portray them as inhumane and unreasonable. Terrorism may
also serve to boost the morale of group members and solidify support behind the group’s
leadership. The choice of violence often comes when the ratio of power between the
government and the minority group is heavily lopsided, when a minority group feels that
is has no other means by which to accomplish its goals. It is relatively inexpensive with
the opportunity for a big impact. Terrorism appears to be most effective when it is
targeted against a relatively non-democratic government, when public views the targets
of violence as legitimate, and when terrorists are clearly excluded from seeking political
change through legitimate political channels (Crenshaw 1983).
Many of the changes resulting from terrorism were not those desired by the
terrorists. For example, a democratic government that fails to react strongly enough to
prevent terrorism may be overthrown by a military dictatorship promising to restore
stability and order through coercive force, such as in Uruguay, Argentina, and Turkey
(Crenshaw, 1983:7). When a regime is already weak or fragmented, terrorism can speed
its demise, but rarely leads to the replacement of the offending government with a more
democratic form of government. Also, terrorism can provoke unanticipated intervention
by an outside third party power. Overall, terrorism may assist in the demise of an already
fractious political system, but is rarely the sole cause of its demise, nor are democratic
Convention