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I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Temporal Dependence and Great Power Conflict |
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Abstract:
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This article attempts to blend two empirically tested theories explaining conflict, power transition and the Kantian peace, into one coherent theory. Because most scholars studying power transition theory have focused their efforts on conceptualizing power, the notion of a dissatisfied state that passes the dominant state is quite underdeveloped. This article improves upon past research by linking the Kantian peace's pacifying effects within interstate dyads with the conceptualization of a dissatisfied state in power transition theory. Using an index of joint democracy, bilateral trade and shared membership in Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) as the measure of a satisfied state, I will reexamine the effects of power parity and challenger satisfaction on major power war. I expect to find that power parity between a challenger state and the dominant power is only conflict-prone in dyads with low joint democracy scores, minimal levels of bilateral trade and few shared IGOs. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
conflict (190), power (127), peac (108), year (103), variabl (93), intern (81), war (81), state (78), dyad (74), democraci (65), probabl (52), allianc (52), model (49), joint (47), depend (45), two (42), tempor (42), william (41), polit (38), effect (38), 1 (38), |
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Association:
Name: International Studies Association
URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Williams, Laron. "I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Temporal Dependence and Great Power Conflict" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71896_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Williams, L. K. , 2005-03-05 "I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Temporal Dependence and Great Power Conflict" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71896_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This article attempts to blend two empirically tested theories explaining conflict, power transition and the Kantian peace, into one coherent theory. Because most scholars studying power transition theory have focused their efforts on conceptualizing power, the notion of a dissatisfied state that passes the dominant state is quite underdeveloped. This article improves upon past research by linking the Kantian peace's pacifying effects within interstate dyads with the conceptualization of a dissatisfied state in power transition theory. Using an index of joint democracy, bilateral trade and shared membership in Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) as the measure of a satisfied state, I will reexamine the effects of power parity and challenger satisfaction on major power war. I expect to find that power parity between a challenger state and the dominant power is only conflict-prone in dyads with low joint democracy scores, minimal levels of bilateral trade and few shared IGOs. |
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33 |
| Word count: |
12039 |
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| I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Temporal Dependence and Great Power Conflict Laron Williams Department of Political Science Texas A&M University lwilliams@polisci.tamu.edu Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association in Honolulu Hawaii March 2-5 2005. Williams 2 I Can't Get No Satisfaction: Temporal Dependence and Great Power Conflict Power transition theory explains great power conflict through the dynamics of relative power distribution. The theory posits that the most peaceful society is one in which there is |
| of 0.44 and a p-value of 0.51. 9 This is justified and will not produce omitted variable bias because the Wald test confirmed the insignificance of the coefficients: chi squared value of 0.48 and a p value of 0.49. 10 Coefficients "estimate the change in log odds of being in the category of interest on the response for a one-unit increase in the jth predictor controlling for all other predictors in the model" (Demaris 1992). 11 The Stata 8.0 |
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