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Leaders and Conflict
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Civil War, Interstate Conflict, and Tenure
∗
Giacomo Chiozza
†
& H. E. Goemans
‡
February 22, 2005
Abstract
Internal and international conflict have long been studied separately by different sub-fields in political science. Because of this unfortunate balkanization in the disci-pline, the relation between international and internal conflict remains understudiedand poorly understood. To begin to remedy this situation, we examine the reciprocalrelationships between internal war, international conflict and the tenure of leaders. Weestimate a Bayesian three-way simultaneous hierarchical probit model and find strongevidence for the endogeneity of internal and international conflict, as well as for theendogeneity of the loss of office and both forms of conflict. Specifically, we find ev-idence of a positive feedback loop between internal and international conflict. Thus,as the risk of internal conflict increases, the risk of international conflict increases aswell, and vice versa. We also find a positive feedback loop between the loss of officeand internal conflict. We find evidence for a negative feedback loop between the lossof office and international conflict.
Keywords: political leaders, tenure, civil war, international conflict.
∗
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2004 Annual APSA Convention in Chicago, 2–5
September and the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference in The Hague, 9-11 September,2004. We thank Kristian Skrede Gelditsch, Kevin Clarke, Han Dorussen, Nikolay Marinov, Arthur Spirling,Michael D. Ward, and Erich Weede for comments and suggestions. Mistakes, omissions, and other assortedinfelicities are our own responsibility. Authors’ names are in alphabetical order. Gleditsch is grateful forsupport from the National Science Foundation (SES-0351670).
†
Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Olin Institute, Harvard University. (## email not listed ##).
‡
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
(## email not listed ##).
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| | Authors: Chiozza, Giacomo. and Goemans, Hein. |
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Civil War, Interstate Conflict, and Tenure
∗
Giacomo Chiozza
†
& H. E. Goemans
‡
February 22, 2005
Abstract
Internal and international conflict have long been studied separately by different sub- fields in political science. Because of this unfortunate balkanization in the disci- pline, the relation between international and internal conflict remains understudied and poorly understood. To begin to remedy this situation, we examine the reciprocal relationships between internal war, international conflict and the tenure of leaders. We estimate a Bayesian three-way simultaneous hierarchical probit model and find strong evidence for the endogeneity of internal and international conflict, as well as for the endogeneity of the loss of office and both forms of conflict. Specifically, we find ev- idence of a positive feedback loop between internal and international conflict. Thus, as the risk of internal conflict increases, the risk of international conflict increases as well, and vice versa. We also find a positive feedback loop between the loss of office and internal conflict. We find evidence for a negative feedback loop between the loss of office and international conflict.
Keywords: political leaders, tenure, civil war, international conflict.
∗
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2004 Annual APSA Convention in Chicago, 2–5
September and the 5th Pan-European International Relations Conference in The Hague, 9-11 September, 2004. We thank Kristian Skrede Gelditsch, Kevin Clarke, Han Dorussen, Nikolay Marinov, Arthur Spirling, Michael D. Ward, and Erich Weede for comments and suggestions. Mistakes, omissions, and other assorted infelicities are our own responsibility. Authors’ names are in alphabetical order. Gleditsch is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0351670).
†
Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Olin Institute, Harvard University. (## email not listed ##).
‡
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
(## email not listed ##).
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