3
secessionist states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, etc.); for the sake of brevity, we call these the states involved in
secessions (SISs). We investigate one of the consequences of the border creation, that is the
circumstances under which the secession attenuates the underlying territorial dispute to the extent that
subsequent armed confrontations over the boundary and between SISs are avoided.
More formally, in this project the focus is on the causes of international-level
3
militarized conflict
over territory (“conflict” for short), taking place between the rump and secessionist states – or between
secessionist states in the case of multilateral secessions – that formerly constituted a single country. The
study aims to answer the question of why are some secessions followed by boundary conflicts between
SISs while others are not? We examine the secession’s consequences from the territorial dispute
perspective because they are territorial phenomena determining who controls which lands (Henderson and
Lebow, 1974; Waterman, 1984; 1989). By taking this approach, we aim to extend the territorial conflict
literature’s coverage to this largely ignored subject area and inform the pro- vs. anti-secession debate by
providing an explanation that could account for both peaceful and violent post-division outcomes.
Although most attention in this subject area has been paid to the post-Cold War ethnic secessions,
secessions are neither recent nor exclusively ethnic phenomena. For instance, Sweden and Norway ended
their union in 1905 and countries have been divided for ideological (e.g. China-Taiwan) as well as
economic (e.g. Singapore-Malaysia) reasons. We thus strive to develop a parsimonious explanation that
applies to ethnic and non-ethnic cases alike as well as to a time period significantly longer than the post-
Cold War era. However, because we aim to explore the consequences of successful self-determination
drives, the cases that interest us the most are cases with a significant internal motivation for the breakup.
4
In contrast, the cases in which the division of the country has been imposed internationally and without a
notable domestic desire (e.g. the divisions of Germany, Korea, or Vietnam) are beyond the scope of this
3
Due to space considerations, the issue of post-secession domestic conflict is left to a future study.
4
We are also interested in those cases where the division of the country resulted from a combination of domestic
and international forces, such as the case of Austria-Hungary where the breakup of the state that has been sought by
its many ethnic groups has not been accomplished until its defeat in World War I. One could even argue that some
degree of external involvement is present in all successful bids for independence. Secessionist attempts that fail to
secure the needed level of international support fall short of becoming states (e.g. southern Sudan, Bosnian Serbs,
Eritrea prior to 1993, etc.).
Convention