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Satellite States - Transatlantic Conflict and the Galileo System
Unformatted Document Text:  Bastian Giegerich Draft – not for citation agreement guarantees that Galileo will not interfere with the M-code meaning that US navigation warfare capabilities remained intact. Braibanti also highlighted non- discrimination in satellite navigation goods and services trade as a key objective shared by both sides. In conclusion, he argued the agreement reached presented a “win-win outcome” (see: Ibid.). Tomas Valesek of the Centre for Defence Information argued “the US got what it wanted: the right to have a secure encrypted system that can allow it to function in battle but allow it to jam others” (quoted in: Dempsey 2004). Clearly both sides made significant concessions to arrive at a cooperative outcome. As Lewis has pointed out the basic compromise underpinning the outcome gives both sides what they needed to claim success: “U.S. acceptance of Galileo as an independent satellite navigation system in exchange for EU acceptance of US security and commercial concerns” (Lewis 2004: 8). The agreement was finalized over the course of the spring 2004 and signed in June. All of the key elements highlighted by Hilbrecht and Braibanti found its way into the final version which carries the unwieldy title ‘Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite- Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications’. 6. Lessons to be Learned This paper analyzed transatlantic conflicts and negotiations on Galileo in order to distil broader lessons to be learned for transatlantic negotiations and specifically the formulation of European positions and interests in this process. Given that there was intense disagreement between the US and the European Commission on key points and the fact that both sides were, for a while, talking at cross purposes because of their underlying motivations, the agreement formulated through negotiations seems to be remarkably even-handed. Both sides managed to protect their respective core interests. In fact, close cooperation was the result of the negotiations. The principles of the June 2004 agreement are being transformed into specific initiatives through transatlantic working groups. An important starting point to understand this outcome is that interoperability between GPS and Galileo in principle is in the interest of both Americans and 15

Authors: Giegerich, Bastian.
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background image
Bastian Giegerich
Draft – not for citation
agreement guarantees that Galileo will not interfere with the M-code meaning that US
navigation warfare capabilities remained intact. Braibanti also highlighted non-
discrimination in satellite navigation goods and services trade as a key objective shared
by both sides. In conclusion, he argued the agreement reached presented a “win-win
outcome” (see: Ibid.). Tomas Valesek of the Centre for Defence Information argued
“the US got what it wanted: the right to have a secure encrypted system that can allow it
to function in battle but allow it to jam others” (quoted in: Dempsey 2004).
Clearly both sides made significant concessions to arrive at a cooperative
outcome. As Lewis has pointed out the basic compromise underpinning the outcome
gives both sides what they needed to claim success: “U.S. acceptance of Galileo as an
independent satellite navigation system in exchange for EU acceptance of US security
and commercial concerns” (Lewis 2004: 8). The agreement was finalized over the
course of the spring 2004 and signed in June. All of the key elements highlighted by
Hilbrecht and Braibanti found its way into the final version which carries the unwieldy
title ‘Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-
Based Navigation Systems and Related Applications’.
6. Lessons to be Learned
This paper analyzed transatlantic conflicts and negotiations on Galileo in order
to distil broader lessons to be learned for transatlantic negotiations and specifically the
formulation of European positions and interests in this process. Given that there was
intense disagreement between the US and the European Commission on key points and
the fact that both sides were, for a while, talking at cross purposes because of their
underlying motivations, the agreement formulated through negotiations seems to be
remarkably even-handed. Both sides managed to protect their respective core interests.
In fact, close cooperation was the result of the negotiations. The principles of the June
2004 agreement are being transformed into specific initiatives through transatlantic
working groups.
An important starting point to understand this outcome is that interoperability
between GPS and Galileo in principle is in the interest of both Americans and
15


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