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Domestic Veto Players and Trade Liberalization: the United States, the European Union, and the Cairns Group Negotiating Positions from the GATT Uruguay Round to the WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting

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Abstract:

Observes often argue that the institutional context of international trade negotiations influence not only their outcomes but offsets domestic obstacles to liberalization. This paper argues that the presence of domestic veto players in the policy process counteracts any favorable institutional context to liberalization by narrowing the likelihood for it. To find out, I develop a model in which a GATT/WTO member set its negotiating position in the 'run up' to a GATT/WTO meeting. The model indicates that a country's negotiating position is the result of an agreement among domestic individual or collective actors and the presence of these veto players not only constrains a country's negotiating position in a GATT/WTO meeting but influence its outcome. I test the model by analyzing archival information concerning the European Union, the United States and the Cairns Group negotiating positions over trade liberalization at the Uruguay Round (1986 to 1994) and at the WTO Doha Ministerial meeting. The findings contradict many aspects of recent scholarship on issue linkages and trade liberalization. For instance, linkage between issues that encourages trade liberalization only occurs when veto players from each issue-area are band-wagon into it. The paper yields a number of additional testable hypotheses, concerning, for instance the differential influence of domestic veto players over shifts into the policy process that promote liberalization. Preliminary quantitative analyses offer support for these hypotheses.
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Name: International Studies Association
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http://www.isanet.org


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MLA Citation:

Morales-Ortiz, Javier. "Domestic Veto Players and Trade Liberalization: the United States, the European Union, and the Cairns Group Negotiating Positions from the GATT Uruguay Round to the WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72187_index.html>

APA Citation:

Morales-Ortiz, J. , 2005-03-05 "Domestic Veto Players and Trade Liberalization: the United States, the European Union, and the Cairns Group Negotiating Positions from the GATT Uruguay Round to the WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72187_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Observes often argue that the institutional context of international trade negotiations influence not only their outcomes but offsets domestic obstacles to liberalization. This paper argues that the presence of domestic veto players in the policy process counteracts any favorable institutional context to liberalization by narrowing the likelihood for it. To find out, I develop a model in which a GATT/WTO member set its negotiating position in the 'run up' to a GATT/WTO meeting. The model indicates that a country's negotiating position is the result of an agreement among domestic individual or collective actors and the presence of these veto players not only constrains a country's negotiating position in a GATT/WTO meeting but influence its outcome. I test the model by analyzing archival information concerning the European Union, the United States and the Cairns Group negotiating positions over trade liberalization at the Uruguay Round (1986 to 1994) and at the WTO Doha Ministerial meeting. The findings contradict many aspects of recent scholarship on issue linkages and trade liberalization. For instance, linkage between issues that encourages trade liberalization only occurs when veto players from each issue-area are band-wagon into it. The paper yields a number of additional testable hypotheses, concerning, for instance the differential influence of domestic veto players over shifts into the policy process that promote liberalization. Preliminary quantitative analyses offer support for these hypotheses.

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