Luther 1
Immanuel Kant and Political Judgment:
From the Metaphysics of Right to Postmetaphysical Politics
Tim Luther,
California Baptist University
Immanuel Kant has shaped modern philosophy more than almost anyone else. He
tries to steer between the dangers of unfounded dogmatism and rampant skepticism. His
transcendental philosophy represents more than an intellectual climax of the
Enlightenment, but is also its transformation. His belief in progress leads him to critique
all dogmatic philosophy and to the discovery of the ultimate foundation of reason.
1
Kant
was driven by a profound concern over a problem that the philosophy of his day could
not deal with adequately. The problem was how to reconcile two seemingly
contradictory interpretations of events, one holding that all events are the product of
necessity, and the other saying that there is freedom in certain aspects of human behavior.
Viewed externally, occurrences seem to be driven by powerful outside forces. What
appears accidental in the individual is determinate and predictable in the species. Yet, at
the same time, all human beings experience the sense of moral duty, which implies that
they, unlike other elements of nature, possess freedom in their behavior.
2
In Kant’s day, philosophy was divided by controversies among rationalists,
skeptics, and empiricists. He neither sidesteps the issue nor joins the parties of the
controversy, but instead adopts a previously undiscovered way to liberate metaphysics
from its muddled situation.
3
His critique is not a condemnation of reason, but rather is a
determination of its source, extent, and limits. He rejects both empiricism and
rationalism. With Kant’s critique, reason dismisses rationalism because reality cannot be
known by mere thought, but it also rejects empiricism. Although he admits that all
knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that knowledge originates solely in
experience. On the contrary, empirical knowledge is impossible without sources
1
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), p. 8.
2
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 33.
3
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 9.
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