Luther 52
Kant’s theory of right, since both hold that a law-governed community is capable of
reconciling freedom and equality. Moreover, both note that authority relies on the
reciprocal communication of ideas.
207
Both further argue that the formal autonomy of
judgment secures the moral worth of all judging subjects.
Moreover, Kant’s political philosophy recognizes the lack of metaphysical truths
and the need for critical thinking. Like Habermas, practical exigencies thus transform the
pure principle of popular sovereignty into the pragmatic rule that the power to legislate
must reside in a popularly elected majoritarian representative assembly, as opposed to the
idea that each citizen must consent directly to every law.
208
Kant’s subjectivity is
common, hence communicative and public.
209
Thus, Kant’s subjective judgment is not
far from Habermas’s conception of intersubjectivity. Kant and Habermas manage to
avoid the pitfalls of relativism and skepticism.
210
In conclusion, both Kant and Habermas
create postmetaphysical conceptions of justice supported by republican political
institutions and practices.
207
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, p. 201.
208
Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 48.
209
Kant, Critique of Judgement, p. 75, and Jaspers, Kant, p. 95.
210
Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice, p. 216.
Convention