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a vision that is, in many ways, a tragic vision, one that identifies the conflicting passions
and emotions that wrack the human psyche in every day life.
The Argument of Part III
Part III of The Theory of Moral Sentiments is organized around three closely-
related topics: the foundation of our judgments concerning our sentiments and actions,
the rise of conscience out of these judgments, and our sense of duty. The argument
running throughout Part III is complex. Of the seven parts that comprise the sixth and
final edition, Part III is the longest, running 70 pages in the Glasgow edition. It
underwent significant revision from the fifth to the sixth edition as Smith tried to work
out the logic of many of his earlier ideas, particularly those centering on the tension
between our natural desires to want to be praised by others for our moral character and to
be praiseworthy. Only the final two chapters of Part III, “Of the influence and authority
of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the
Deity” (Chapter V) and “In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of
our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives” (Chapter VI)
remain remarkably intact throughout all six editions. The other four chapters, however,
contain significant revisions.
Why the changes? I would argue that there is a consistency in the structure of
Smith’s overall argument that ties together virtue, conscience, and duty. But the details
of his argument, particularly those regarding virtue and conscience, continued to trouble
him throughout the various revisions. From the outset in the first edition, Smith wanted to
develop a perspective that would enable him to highlight the tension between our
commitments to virtue and duty because of the workings of our passions. The discussion
Convention