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his most restrictive formulation of war guilt Locke included those individuals who “consented”
to the unjust use of force (II: 179).
He appears to accept the commonsense empirical
observation that communities can, have in the past, and probably will in the future support
aggressive, expansionist policies. The unifying thread in Locke’s analogy between external
aggression and domestic arbitrary rule is the purportedly self-destructive character of each
inasmuch as both endanger the basic freedom instrumental to self-preservation (Zuckert 1994:
240-6; Glenn 1984: 90-6). Once again, the domestic analogy between civil and international
relations is by no means obvious. Is consenting to or supporting aggression against a weaker
neighbour as clearly self-destructive as enslaving oneself or submitting to an arbitrary
government? Admittedly, the aggressor state submits itself to the possibility of universal
punishment by all other peace-loving states, but this punishment is hardly guaranteed. The more
fundamental moral imperative against international aggression must be that as a general principle
aggression undermines the equal respect for sovereignty and political independence which, in
theory at least, all commonwealths including the aggressor have a presumptive right to enjoy.
The third aspect of Locke’s lawful conquest theory with a direct bearing on the issue of
sovereignty is his treatment of the concept of total war. Locke considers the possibility that
every adult male may be held responsible for aggression by virtue of their membership in a given
political society: “Let us suppose that all Men of that Community being all Members of the same
Body Politick, may be taken to have joyn’d in that unjust War, wherein they are subdued, and so
their Lives are at the Mercy of the Conquerour” (II: 188). From this very expansive idea of war
guilt Locke nonetheless still manages to establish clear limits on lawful conquest that never
extends to punishing “innocent” women and children or claiming the property originally held by
the captive men (II: 180, 182-4). Even Locke’s broadest construction of responsibility for
Convention