3
such a right exists, it is not clear who is entitled to claim it and what they are entitled to.
What is a ‘people’? And how can self-determination be justified?
5
Two attempts at defining the ‘nation’
i. Margalit and Raz’s ‘encompassing group’
One approach to self-determination strives to answer the latter question by
tackling the former. Scholars such as David Miller and Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz
have focused on the nature of the subject to which the right applies; namely, the nation,
or the members of the nation. Margalit and Raz purport to search for those
“characteristics which are relevant to the justification of the right [to self-
determination]”
6
. Their prototypical self-determining group has a ‘common character’
and a ‘common culture’ and is postulated to consist of people who acquire the group
culture while growing up. Usually, membership in the self-determining group is
important for the members’ self-identification. Face-to-face contact is possible only with
a fraction of the nation’s members, but members recognize one another through symbolic
or conventional means of identification, notably participation in group ceremonies or use
of a common language. Although membership is ascribed, Margalit and Raz also claim
that it is ‘a matter of mutual recognition’. The above characteristics describe what
Margalit and Raz call an ‘encompassing group’
7
; a group, membership of which is
5
At times, I will refer to the situation in present-day Iraq to complement its theoretical arguments. These
references will be illustrations only; the paper will not attempt to deal with the case of Iraq in a systematic
or exhaustive manner.
6
Margalit, A. & Raz, J., “National Self-Determination”, The Journal of Philosophy, 87(9), 439-461, 1990,
p.443.
7
Margalit & Raz, p.448.
Convention