8
States with more extreme public ideology should decrease the range of acceptable candidates, as
candidates furthest from the median public attitude have greater costs in attaining office.
H6
D
:
The range of ideology decreases in more ideologically extreme states, as justice
preferences are most similar to public attitudes.
Electoral competition also has a strong effect on selection. Greater state electoral competition
should decrease the acceptable range of candidates, increasing the costs related to office.
H7
D
:
The range of ideology decreases as electoral competition increase, as competition
increases the costs related to office.
V.
Consensus Hypotheses
Previous research reveals that several categories of factors influence the behavior of the state
supreme courts, including structural, contextual, and case-level characteristics. Using an institutional
approach to judicial decision-making at the state courts level, I assert that these factors in addition to
ideological diversity have an impact on judicial decision-making.
Ideological Diversity
Ideological diversity is defined as the range of justice ideology in each state supreme court. Also,
the level of court polarization, ideological diversity is expected to have a negative impact on consensus
and the event of unanimity. Conflict is expected where courts are ideologically more heterogeneous. The
impact of ideological diversity should be strong for both elected and appointed courts.
H1
C
:
The event of unanimity is less likely where the ideological range of the state supreme
courts is greatest.
Structural Features
The presence of intermediate appellate courts should decrease the level of consensus, as noted
from past research (Brace and Hall 1990; Cannon and Jaros 1970; Glick and Pruet 1986). Reaction to
lower appellate courts should be strongest in appellate courts.
H2A
C
: The event of unanimity is less likely within appointed courts where lower appellate
courts exist.
H2B
C
: The event of unanimity is more likely within elected courts where lower appellate courts
exist.
Random or rotating opinion assignment rules are expected to promote consensus, maintaining
cohesion within the courts. Discretionary opinion assignments, on the other hand, are anticipated to
promote conflict and dissensus (Brace and Hall, 1990, 1992). The impact should be greatest in appointed
courts, as justices are freer to vote sincerely.
H3A
C
: Non-discretionary opinion assignments discourage unanimous decision outcomes within
appointed courts.
Convention