7
Office Value - Structural Characteristics
With more positions, ideologically extreme candidates have a greater opportunity to pursue
judicial office as the value of office declines. Ideological diversity relates to both office turnover (see
state legislatures, Fiorina, 1994) and lower value and prestige of office.
H1
D
: The range of justice ideology increases with more court positions, with more positions
decreasing the value and prestige of office.
Term length also has an influence on office value. Longer terms provide greater flexibility and
independence, increasing the value of office. Longer term lengths have the consequence of reducing
electoral sanctions within elected courts.
H2
D
:
The range of ideology decreases within courts with longer term lengths, as longer term
lengths decrease the value and prestige office.
Professionalization is noted to affect the attractiveness for most political institutions (Squire
1988a, 1988b). With a variety of institutional structures, the state supreme courts provide an array of
highly professionalized and less professionalized judicial structures.
Contributions to greater
professionalization at the state supreme court level include elevated staff support, higher salary, and
decreased work load.
H3
D
:
The range of ideology decreases within courts with higher levels of professionalization,
as increased professionalization increases the value of office.
Office Risk - Methods of Judicial Selection
As noted, state methods of judicial selection vary dramatically from state to state unlike many
other American political institutions. Unlike state legislatures, which have some systematic variation (i.e.
Nebraska’s non-partisan unicameral legislature), most state legislatures are partisan and bicameral with
similar methods of selection. Like other elected offices, judicial candidates are most successful where
candidate ideology is closest to the median public ideology (Downs, 1957). In appointed states, candidate
ideology should be most similar to elite preferences, creating a wider range of judicial preferences.
H4
D
:
The range of ideology decreases in elected state supreme courts, as candidates nearest the
median voter’s preference overcome risks related to office.
While non-tradition judges benefit differently from appointed selection systems (Bratton and
Spill 2002; Martin and Pyle 2000, 2002), selection by vacancy appointments should resemble other
appointed forms of selection with judges resembling elite preferences.
H5
D
:
The range of ideology increases in states with vacancy appointments, as judges resemble
elite preferences which vary by the executive party.
Office Costs - Political Context
Convention