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Latin America Veto Players and Policy Change
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LATIN AMERICAN VETO PLAYERS AND POLICY CHANGE
Paula Karlsson
6210 Vermillion Blvd
New Orleans, LA 70122.
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
This paper builds on veto player research in an analysis of structural reform in LatinAmerica. I explicate the impact of institutional and partisan divisions, as well as thepresident’s constitutional powers. I also highlight how preferences for structural reformcondition the impact of institutional variables. My theoretical model first outlines theeffects of institutional divisions in the form of bicameralism and federalism. It thenexplicates the role of executive-legislative partisan divisions and legislative cohesion.Last, it turns to the impact of presidential veto powers and decree powers. I test mymodel on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data for 16 Latin American countries duringthe time period of 1980-1995. I find that only a few of my variables have a significanteffect on reform. Specifically, I find that partisan factors seem to matter more thaninstitutional ones. While presidential-legislative congruence has a positive effect,legislative cohesion has a negative impact. Hence, contrary to my theoreticalexpectations, not any form of political unity will promote policy change. It seems thatpresidents are more reform-minded than are legislatures and that presidents are more ableto push for reform when his partisan influence there is large. Even then, there are somedifferences among legislatures—the variance of reform increases with the level ofpresidential-legislative congruence. This suggests that presidential-legislative divisions ismore of a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy stability.
Prepared for delivery at the 2005 meeting of the Southwestern Political ScienceAssociation, New Orleans, LA, March 23-26, 2005.
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| | Authors: Karlsson, Paula. |
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1
LATIN AMERICAN VETO PLAYERS AND POLICY CHANGE
Paula Karlsson
6210 Vermillion Blvd
New Orleans, LA 70122.
E-mail: ## email not listed ##
This paper builds on veto player research in an analysis of structural reform in Latin
America. I explicate the impact of institutional and partisan divisions, as well as the
president’s constitutional powers. I also highlight how preferences for structural reform
condition the impact of institutional variables. My theoretical model first outlines the
effects of institutional divisions in the form of bicameralism and federalism. It then
explicates the role of executive-legislative partisan divisions and legislative cohesion.
Last, it turns to the impact of presidential veto powers and decree powers. I test my
model on time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data for 16 Latin American countries during
the time period of 1980-1995. I find that only a few of my variables have a significant
effect on reform. Specifically, I find that partisan factors seem to matter more than
institutional ones. While presidential-legislative congruence has a positive effect,
legislative cohesion has a negative impact. Hence, contrary to my theoretical
expectations, not any form of political unity will promote policy change. It seems that
presidents are more reform-minded than are legislatures and that presidents are more able
to push for reform when his partisan influence there is large. Even then, there are some
differences among legislatures—the variance of reform increases with the level of
presidential-legislative congruence. This suggests that presidential-legislative divisions is
more of a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy stability.
Prepared for delivery at the 2005 meeting of the Southwestern Political Science
Association, New Orleans, LA, March 23-26, 2005.
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