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shortsighted the assumption that violence and poverty could be contained by walls. They
declared it an attempt at “social apartheid, [which is unjustified] when what is needed is
investment in poor communities” (www.brazzil.com).
Conde himself admitted to the symbolic as well as practical impact that the walls would
have. The BBC Online reports him to have said, “We need to build [the wall] immediately…The
wall isn’t to stop violence—It is to mark off territory” (www.news.bbc.co.uk, April 12, 2004).
Conde’s explicit goal is to “mark territory” and “contain” violence in certain favelas. This
discourse represents an effort to both visually and politically exclude the poor.
When enclosed by walls, favelados would be hidden from the view of other South Zone
residents. It is not coincidental that the proposed partial walls mask only the sides of the favelas
that face the more affluent neighborhoods in the South Zone. According to Conde’s proposal,
the walls would cover the Gâvea side of the Vidigal favela and the Leblón side of the Chácara do
Céu favela. As occurred in the 1990 urban renewal projects in Rio de Janeiro, such as Favela
Cidade, the houses closest to the highways or tunnels (where middle to upper-class drivers can
see them), were painted and “renewed” first. A similar phenomenon took place before the most
recent local São Paulo elections: houses along the highways were painted, in an effort to appear
as if the government was renovating and paying attention to the favelados (Huggins, interview
by author, 12/3/04). These types of projects are not new nor are they particularly effective at
addressing the underlying issues of violence and deteriorating living conditions in favelas. The
favelados were excluded visually and symbolically on the tourist maps and promotional videos.
Conde proposed a means to symbolically, politically, and physically hide and exclude the
favelados.
Convention