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changes in the conditions of legislative service attract Democrats and repel Republicans, then
legislative professionalization should reduce the frequency of unified Republican government.
Fiorina (1994) qualifies his argument in three ways. First, his argument says, “…nothing
about net turnover in legislatures” (Fiorina 1994, 307). His paper only argues that increased
session length and pay advantages Democrats relative to Republicans. Second, potential
candidates for the lower houses of state legislatures in states whose legislatures are more
professionalized face altered payoffs such that fewer Republicans will run for state legislatures
and more Democrats will do so (Fiorina 1994, 307). Finally, he asserts, but does not test, the idea
that prospective candidates look at the wages and time requirements before deciding to run for
office (Fiorina 1994, 308).
Several researchers have criticized Fiorina’s theoretical argument. Stonecash and
Agathangelou (1997) illuminate five potential problems with Fiorina’s analysis. First, they argue
that Fiorina does not provide any evidence to show that Democratic and Republican candidates
come from different socioeconomic strata (Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997, 149). Second,
Fiorina, “…neglects the effect of long-term regional trends in the partisan composition of state
legislatures” (Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997, 149). Third, they stipulate that Fiorina only
examines the relationship between professionalization and the proportion of Democrats within
state legislatures on an aggregate level and does not examine whether this relationship holds on a
state-by-state basis (Stonecash and Agathangelou 1997, 149). Fourth, they argue that Fiorina
eliminates those cases which contradict his argument by excluding southern states (Stonecash
and Agathangelou 1997, 149). Finally, they criticize Fiorina’s use of data from the Book of the
States as they say that data from this book upwardly biases his measures (Stonecash and
Agathangelou 1997, 152).
Convention