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However, when describing the rest of the Business Roundtable’s view of the Clinton plan
Boyleston said, “just as many companies if not more were philosophically opposed” as
those that were economically opposed (personal correspondence September 4, 2002).
The policy committee of the Business Roundtable was also much more diverse
than the task force. In an interview with The Plain Dealer, John Ong, chairman of B.F.
Goodrich and head of the policy committee, stated that on January 13 and 14, 1994 there
were two teleconferences in which all Roundtable members were given a chance to give
their input (King 1994, p. A1). A majority of the 65 businesses in the policy committee
voted to endorse the Cooper plan rather than the Clinton plan (Chen and Tumulty, 1994).
“Of the 65 Roundtable members who voted Wednesday, only 17 represented health
insurers, drug-makers, or other health care concerns, according to Johanna Schneider a
Roundtable spokeswoman” (Chen and Tumulty, 1994, p. A1). In other words, strong
economic self-interest to avoid government regulations from the “health care industry”
can only explain part of the Roundtable’s incentive to oppose the Clinton plan.
Indeed, the Roundtable on the whole appeared to be an organization that would be
supportive of the Clinton plan. William Custer, an analyst for the Washington-based
Employee Benefit Research Institute, “expressed surprise at the endorsement, because big
companies stand to benefit from universal health coverage, which probably would lower
their overall health costs” (Hendrick, 1994, p. A1). A senior White House official said,
“the sadness is that they really think health reform is in the interest of business,
particularly big business, most of whom provide health insurance for their workers. But
it appears the reaction was more ideological than pragmatic” (Lauter, 1994, p. A37).
Convention