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to the common good. Without political rule, that is, speech concerning the common good,
democracy is like a large household, with many heads instead of one but otherwise
qualitatively indistinct. Aristotle does not say that democracy is the only regime that can rule
itself in a distinctly political way, but his classification of regimes suggests that it is at least
possible for democracy to become a genuinely political regime. Aristotle’s defense of
democracy, or to be more precise, “polity,” or politeia, hinges on the claim that the many, or
the demos, can in fact rule in the way characteristic of “political” regimes. Just as Aristotle’s
household is able to become a political community, so too can democracy become a politeia,
that is, a distinctly political democracy. To make this transition, the demos will require a certain
way of knowing, not in the manner of philosopher kings or an aristocratic elite, but a
practical form of wisdom available to all. Given Aristotle’s classification of regimes, it
appears that phronesis has a special task to play in a democracy, that is, to maintain the
political rule characteristic of the polity, and this may, in fact, be the highest task for phronesis
in Aristotle’s political theory. In sum, then, Aristotle’s account of the highest aspects of
human nature, his distinction between political and corrupt regimes, and his defense of
democracy all hinge on the human capacity for deliberative practical wisdom in this strong
political sense.
Fortunately, in his accounts of Greek tragedy and the tragic emotions, Aristotle has
shown that human beings are capable of such a deliberative ethos, and he has shown what
such an ethos might look like. In particular, Aristotle’s ideal public deliberation presupposes
many of the stronger other-regarding qualities we have observed in the ethos of the individual
who experiences the tragic emotions. Central to Aristotle’s concept of public deliberation is
that it involves speech with a view to justice. First, a concern for justice will also be present
in pity as defined by Aristotle as well as in his unique concept of fear. Since pity
Convention