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being distinctly human. This sort of practical wisdom is not the perfect knowledge of
omniscient gods, but nor is it the immediate impulsiveness of the animals. Instead, public
practical wisdom allows human beings to make informed choices the best way they (and only
they) know how: through speech in common with others concerning justice. Finally,
Aristotelian public deliberation is natural in Aristotle’s sense of telos, or end, since it is
through public practical wisdom that individuals are transformed into citizens and
democracies into genuinely political democracies.
All this is not to say that Aristotelian natural foundations produce anything like a
complete set of rules to be mechanically applied to any and all moral problems in some
absolute or certain way. Rather, Aristotle’s naturalism points more towards an ethos, a certain
outside limit on what counts as public practical wisdom, and broad criteria by which to begin
distinguishing better from worse claims to public knowledge. While this ethos requires a core
set of pre-political universal truths, it leaves ample room for choice and action on the vast
majority of political and ethical decisions. Aristotle’s conceptions of both the tragic
emotions and genuinely political deliberation are strong enough to be universal, but flexible
enough to be democratic.
Convention