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Vietnam foreign policy landscape “ushered in a period of anxious introspection”
(Omestad, 1994, p. 77) for the American public that successive administrations have had
to face (Melanson, 1996); and it is at least unclear whether, for all the ways in which the
world supposedly changed in the aftermath of 9/11, that that mood has dramatically
shifted with respect to questions of the use of American armed force.
These dynamics may have altered President Bush’s ability to effect literalization,
and with it the ability to deny the contestability of the foreign policy images. These
images may still remain contestable, even in the post-9/11 environment, because of the
difficulties of effecting intentions-expectations alignment. The historical record leads us
to expect that “rally ’round the flag” events--where identifiable and easily demonized
enemies commit clear acts aggression --will create rhetorical situations where
expectations and intentions readily meet, but in the rhetorical and policy environment I
am suggesting, the generally altered expectations of the public that are a legacy of the
“Vietnam syndrome” may still reveal an attitude that simply refuses to tolerate significant
combat casualties and sustained intervention for any but the clearest instances of foreign
policy emergency. The public is demonstrably leery of intervening in the internal affairs
of another country where a quagmire conflict may await.
These foreign policy circumstances suggest rhetorical situations characterized by
formidable constraints on presidential rhetoric. Under the weight of these demands,
“shunning political losers” (the habit Newhouse (1992) attributed to the first President
Bush) may make political sense for an administration. More research is necessary here,
but the strategic choices presented by the situation President Bush faced precluded resort
to a rhetoric of sacrifice in the service of the Bush doctrine.
Convention