(Page 5 of 15) - Cost-Effectiveness and the Assessment of Military Elements of Power: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War authored by Davis, Carmel.

Cost and Military Effectiveness: Gulf War Performance at Chechnya Prices?

Carmel Davis
7/30/04
5

operating an expensive aircraft is dependent on the less highly skilled operator of the less
expensive fuel truck and is fed by the less expensive cook using less expensive kitchen
equipment, while they depend on the pilot to fight the enemy.

What is the relationship between Isaacson’s spectra, which distinguish between ground, naval,
and air warfare and do not explicitly addresses the interactions between them, and PSE, which is
highly aggregative? PSE can be calculated at lower levels, and this may be important in the
analytic process. For example, some forces may concentrate their capital intensive and highly
skilled forces into a subset of the entire force (ground, naval, and air), a situation exemplified by
the British in 1939-1940 as they built an integrated air defense system, a heavy bomber force, and
maintained a large navy. British forces had high PSE, though it was not evenly distributed.
Second, within theaters, analysis should be sensitive to the possibility that one side will
concentrate its capital and skilled labor, a situation exemplified by Germany’s concentration of
armor in armored divisions in 1940.

Another approach is to assess sophistication of operations at a higher level. If each of the
components of a force is capable of conducting operations with similar levels of sophistication, it
seems likely that there will be a transitive relationship. Even a force capable of more
sophisticated operations in one environment than in others may have a meaningful PSE because
that mix will meet the country’s goals better than alternative mixes. For example, the US
deployed very sophisticated bomber force and navy in World War II and a less sophisticated
ground force. At the operational level considered by Isaacson’s spectra, US ground forces might
be less sophisticated than German forces but more sophisticated in naval and air terms. The three
working together were able to be overcome the shortcomings of ground forces and to be
successful together where a different mix might have been less successful.

What is the relationship between AE and PSE? High PSE alone is insufficient because a force
with a comparatively low AE and high PSE might overwhelm a force with a high AE and a low
PSE, though the cost for the force with lower PSE may be high. I cannot characterize this better at
this time in terms of AE and PSE and CP approaches appear sufficient to discern when one
country can simply overwhelm another.

Hypotheses
CP and CC approaches can be expressed in hypotheses and tested for plausibility using data from
actual wars. CP approaches discussed above require data like ADEs and WEI/WUV assessments.
I do not have adequate data at this time so CP approaches are not tested. I propose hypotheses for
AE and PSE in terms of war outcomes and wartime performance. War outcome assesses how
well forces do in attaining military goals. These goals might be to defeat enemy forces in pursuit
of total war, as exemplified by World War II. However, they are frequently murky, a situation
exemplified by US goals in the Korean and Vietnam wars. That said, the military outcomes of
many wars are sufficiently clear as to form a judgment. Wartime performance assesses how well
forces perform in battle.

CC Hypotheses

This ASSUMES (ands so may beg the question and be a circular argument) that a force capable of more

sophisticated operations can frequently overcome an adversary only capable of less sophisticated
operations. As discussed with reference to Germany in Russia, this is not always true. Chechnya.