David C. Earnest, Voting Rights for Resident Aliens -- 25
hypothesized, those states that have nationality law based on the
doctrine of jus soli are more likely to enfranchise resident aliens
than jus sanguinis states are. Curiously, however, the three other
significant nationalist variables operate in the direction opposite of
the hypothesized effect. States with more activist and independent
judiciaries are significantly less likely to enfranchise their resident
aliens, not more so as Hypothesis 1(b) stated. Similarly, a state’s
spending on social security operates in the direction opposite to that
predicted in Hypothesis 1(c); rather than leading to increased policing
of claimants and hence a foreclosure of opportunities, states that
spend more on social programs are in fact more likely to extend voting
rights to resident aliens. Finally, parties of the left in fact are
significantly less likely to enfranchise resident aliens than parties
of the right are. This is a surprising reversal of the expectation of
Hypothesis 1(d).
The analysis finds only weak support for the postnationalist
hypotheses. The only postnational factor that is a significant
predictor of a state’s enfranchisement of resident aliens is its
proximity to other states that do so. The mean score on the dependent
variable of bordering states is significant in the direction predicted:
states are more likely to enfranchise resident aliens if their
neighbors do so, suggesting the importance of reciprocity and
immigration flows. The three other postnationalist variables are not
significant. A democracy’s commitment to the international human rights
regime does not make a difference, nor apparently does it’s permeation
by nongovernmental organizations or its foreign policy goals.
Only one of the control variables is significant, though it is a
provocative one. The dummy variable for the European Union is
significant, but it is in the direction opposite of the expectation.
Convention