All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

Regulatory Governance and the Implementation of Universal Service: A Comparative Study of the US and Japan
Unformatted Document Text:  Tracking Number: ICA-1-11804 Regulatory Governance and Universal Service 21 service in the US generally can be characterized by pro-competitive implementation with clear and specified methods that facilitate fair competition and level playing field. 22 The Japanese case: Strategic implementation Unlike the US, in Japan all power to regulate infrastructural industries like telecommunications resides in the national government (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.121). Also, the legislative programs of parliamentary governments seem to spring fully formed from the foreheads of cabinet members and the constitutional authority to make law is concentrated in the national legislature, thus in turn, the executors of law are, formally, that legislature’s appointed agents. Likewise, the overseer of bureaucratic enforcement of legislative intent, the judiciary, is an appointed agent of the legislature and lacks the means to act as a check on the legislative power. Moreover, parliamentary majority in Japan face neither the constitutional impediment to reversing law or policies that they dislike (the veto), nor the concern that they are delegating authority to an executive that they cannot control (Cowhey & McCubbins, pp.5-6). In other words, the main differences in the organization of government between the US and Japan are the role of the courts and the relationships between legislative bodies and executive institutions (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.122). In addition, in terms of the electoral system, the members of the more powerful Diet branch, the House of Representatives, represent multimember districts, with the winners being the leaders in an election based on a single nontransferable vote. In this system, some Diet members can be elected with as little as 10 percent of the popular vote in their districts, and thus in turn, candidates can succeed electorally by focusing their attention on much narrower interest groups (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.123). Concentration of most authority in a single parliamentary body composed of members elected from different constituencies makes decision-making easier and more flexible, but it also enhances the influence of particularistic interests. Compared to the US, regulatory procedures in Japan are informal, confidential, and with few exceptions unlikely to be scrutinized by the judiciary (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.122). In addition, the Japanese policy-making structure is streamlined compared to the US system. The Diet holds complete sovereignty, so the party or coalition that governs the Diet enjoys sole authority over the political affairs of the nation. The only real veto gate in the Japanese government—that is, the only real point in decision process where a proposal may be rejected—as in any parliamentary system, is the majority coalition (Cowhey & McCubbins, p.8). Finally, as mentioned above, there has been no independent regulatory agency like the FCC in Japan. The MPHPT of Japan, a branch of 22 However, the evaluation of universal service in the US may be controversial. For this matter, see Rosston and Wimmer (2000), and Eriksson, Kaserman and Mayo (1998).

Authors: Park, Namkee.
first   previous   Page 21 of 27   next   last



background image
Tracking Number: ICA-1-11804 Regulatory Governance and Universal Service 21
service in the US generally can be characterized by pro-competitive implementation with clear
and specified methods that facilitate fair competition and level playing field.
22
The Japanese case: Strategic implementation
Unlike the US, in Japan all power to regulate infrastructural industries like telecommunications
resides in the national government (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.121). Also, the legislative programs of
parliamentary governments seem to spring fully formed from the foreheads of cabinet members
and the constitutional authority to make law is concentrated in the national legislature, thus in
turn, the executors of law are, formally, that legislature’s appointed agents. Likewise, the
overseer of bureaucratic enforcement of legislative intent, the judiciary, is an appointed agent of
the legislature and lacks the means to act as a check on the legislative power. Moreover,
parliamentary majority in Japan face neither the constitutional impediment to reversing law or
policies that they dislike (the veto), nor the concern that they are delegating authority to an
executive that they cannot control (Cowhey & McCubbins, pp.5-6). In other words, the main
differences in the organization of government between the US and Japan are the role of the courts
and the relationships between legislative bodies and executive institutions (Noll & Rosenbluth,
p.122). In addition, in terms of the electoral system, the members of the more powerful Diet
branch, the House of Representatives, represent multimember districts, with the winners being the
leaders in an election based on a single nontransferable vote. In this system, some Diet members
can be elected with as little as 10 percent of the popular vote in their districts, and thus in turn,
candidates can succeed electorally by focusing their attention on much narrower interest groups
(Noll & Rosenbluth, p.123). Concentration of most authority in a single parliamentary body
composed of members elected from different constituencies makes decision-making easier and
more flexible, but it also enhances the influence of particularistic interests. Compared to the US,
regulatory procedures in Japan are informal, confidential, and with few exceptions unlikely to be
scrutinized by the judiciary (Noll & Rosenbluth, p.122). In addition, the Japanese policy-making
structure is streamlined compared to the US system. The Diet holds complete sovereignty, so the
party or coalition that governs the Diet enjoys sole authority over the political affairs of the
nation. The only real veto gate in the Japanese government—that is, the only real point in
decision process where a proposal may be rejected—as in any parliamentary system, is the
majority coalition (Cowhey & McCubbins, p.8). Finally, as mentioned above, there has been no
independent regulatory agency like the FCC in Japan. The MPHPT of Japan, a branch of
22
However, the evaluation of universal service in the US may be controversial. For this matter, see
Rosston and Wimmer (2000), and Eriksson, Kaserman and Mayo (1998).


Convention
Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events!
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 21 of 27   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.