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Regulatory Governance and the Implementation of Universal Service: A Comparative Study of the US and Japan
Unformatted Document Text:  Tracking Number: ICA-1-11804 Regulatory Governance and Universal Service 6 constrain administrative discretion. But, they maintain, even with these constraints, that policymakers retain a broad range of discretion on the design of regulatory governance and incentive structures. Indeed, according to them, “utility performance turns out to be best when countries have achieved a good fit between their institutions and their regulatory governance and incentive designs and worst when regulatory design proceeds without attention to institutional realities” (pp.6-7). In the same fashion, Weaver and Rockman (1993) maintain that “political institutions shape the processes through which decisions are made and implemented, and these in turn, influence government capabilities” 3 (p.7). For the analysis of government capabilities, they suggest to specify causal linkages between political institutions and decision-making processes and then to show how decision-making processes in turn influence government capabilities (p.8). Furthermore, they provide three tiers of differences in government capabilities; 1) presidential or parliamentary system, 2) regime type or government type, and 3) political, socioeconomic and demographic conditions (p.10). Haggard and McCubbins (2001) also argue that the diversity of economic policies is rooted in the diversity of democratic institutions in each country and they suggest the concepts of political system’s decisiveness and resoluteness. According to them, decisiveness is “the ability of a state to enact and implement policy change,” while resoluteness is “the ability of a state to commit to maintaining a given policy” (pp.26-27). They explain that the decisiveness and resoluteness of a state depend heavily on the effective number of vetoes in the political system. Haggard and McCubbins also state that the judiciary may constitute a veto gate in the governmental processes, if it is both independent and endowed with the power to judge the constitutionality of proposed or enacted policies (p.32). Vogel (1996) also argues that an assessment of state autonomy in policy decision-making often depends on an analysis of the relationship between the state’s institutions. He uses the concepts of regime organization (institutions) and regime orientation (ideas) and maintains that “institutions constrains choices by defining state capabilities, structuring the incorporation of interest groups, and shaping state and social interests” (p.22). In sum, the new institutionalism literature largely emphasizes the motivational effects of formal institutions such as governmental structures, national constitutions, statutes, and formal administrative regulations and in turn, defines how policy is to be made in those institutional 3 According to Weaver and Rockman, government capability means “a pattern of government influence on its environment that produces substantially similar outcomes across time and policy areas” (p.6).

Authors: Park, Namkee.
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Tracking Number: ICA-1-11804 Regulatory Governance and Universal Service 6
constrain administrative discretion. But, they maintain, even with these constraints, that
policymakers retain a broad range of discretion on the design of regulatory governance and
incentive structures. Indeed, according to them, “utility performance turns out to be best when
countries have achieved a good fit between their institutions and their regulatory governance and
incentive designs and worst when regulatory design proceeds without attention to institutional
realities” (pp.6-7).
In the same fashion, Weaver and Rockman (1993) maintain that “political institutions
shape the processes through which decisions are made and implemented, and these in turn,
influence government capabilities”
3
(p.7). For the analysis of government capabilities, they
suggest to specify causal linkages between political institutions and decision-making processes
and then to show how decision-making processes in turn influence government capabilities (p.8).
Furthermore, they provide three tiers of differences in government capabilities; 1) presidential or
parliamentary system, 2) regime type or government type, and 3) political, socioeconomic and
demographic conditions (p.10).
Haggard and McCubbins (2001) also argue that the diversity of economic policies is
rooted in the diversity of democratic institutions in each country and they suggest the concepts of
political system’s decisiveness and resoluteness. According to them, decisiveness is “the ability
of a state to enact and implement policy change,” while resoluteness is “the ability of a state to
commit to maintaining a given policy” (pp.26-27). They explain that the decisiveness and
resoluteness of a state depend heavily on the effective number of vetoes in the political system.
Haggard and McCubbins also state that the judiciary may constitute a veto gate in the
governmental processes, if it is both independent and endowed with the power to judge the
constitutionality of proposed or enacted policies (p.32).
Vogel (1996) also argues that an assessment of state autonomy in policy decision-making
often depends on an analysis of the relationship between the state’s institutions. He uses the
concepts of regime organization (institutions) and regime orientation (ideas) and maintains that
“institutions constrains choices by defining state capabilities, structuring the incorporation of
interest groups, and shaping state and social interests” (p.22).
In sum, the new institutionalism literature largely emphasizes the motivational effects of
formal institutions such as governmental structures, national constitutions, statutes, and formal
administrative regulations and in turn, defines how policy is to be made in those institutional
3
According to Weaver and Rockman, government capability means “a pattern of government influence on
its environment that produces substantially similar outcomes across time and policy areas” (p.6).


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