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networks. The Japanese also realize that buying shares in a Hollywood picture can
mean reaching not only American and Japanese audiences but also tens of millions of
people around the world (1989:26). As Variety addressed in 1991, the Japanese really
wanted to invest in Hollywood:
Every Japanese citizen and his dog seemed to be contemplating an investment in
Hollywood three years ago. A cement maker and a security guard company were
among the many flocking to Hollywood to toss millions of dollars into the
movie industry (Alexander, 1992:41).
However, this effort would not be possible for the next several years because of
the worst recession in Japan. Matsushita sold most parts of MCA to Canadian beverage
giant Seagram co., in April 1995 during the Japanese recession (Littleton, 1996:50).
Hitachi, one of Japan’s largest and richest electronics companies canceled its plan for
investment in Hollywood. Hitachi, whose annual sales of $62 billion equal the size of
Thailand’s GNP, suffered a 45 percent fall in profits in 1990. An executive at Hitachi
stated, “we are interested in Hollywood, but we don’t want to think a buyout is a good
idea” (Alxander, 1992: 41). Japan is still suffering from its worst economic crisis and it
will go continue to so for several years more. Thus, new huge investments are not
likely in the first several years of the new century.
The economic reason is not the only factor in the failure of the investment in
Hollywood. Cultural conflict and anti-Japanese are also major blocks of Japanese
investment in Hollywood (1992:41). One of the chief problems is the basic, deep-
seated ignorance among the Japanese about how Hollywood works—and what sells. As
Richard Essex, managing partner in the investment firm Essex, Eng & Shapiro, said,
Japanese industry isn’t nearly as sophisticated as America’s. The world market for their
Convention