All Academic, Inc. Research Logo

Info/CitationFAQResearchAll Academic Inc.
Document

DOUBT FORECLOSED: U.S. MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Unformatted Document Text:  Doubt Foreclosed 10 Susan Sontag) critical of presidential behavior on day one, including lackluster public addresses. The White House seemingly lied in calling Bush 9-11 movements a response to a “credible security threat” (White, 2001). War fever was facilitated by media dependence on government, military and security service “experts.” The role of Vice-President Dick Cheney was obscured, prompting discussion as to the locus of Administration power. Until May 2002 nobody recalled how Bush had entrusted Cheney in May 2001 with national coordination of responses to domestic terror attacks (Rich, 2002, A15). Vilification of Culprit Through media, the Administration simplistically vilified as culprit one man and his organization – a vital requirement of war propaganda. However much Osama bin Laden’s culpability may seem incontrovertible from this distance of time, it was far less so in the weeks and months immediately following 9-11. Vilification, as justification to attack Afghanistan, was achieved without adequate disclosure of evidence. (A complex relationship between Bin Laden and the CIA has been suggested by Martin, June 6, 2002; Bin Laden had once worked for the General Intelligence Department of the Saudi secret service and is said by Brisard and Dasquie, 2001, to have been a close confidante of Prince Turki, who was head of Saudi intelligence up to a short time prior to 9-11). Disclosed evidence explicitly disclaimed judicial standard. “This document” the dossier began, “does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama bin Laden in a court of law” (Hersh, 2001; Marsden and Grey, 2001). The media case against Bin Laden was mostly assertive and indirect, including retellings of previous (alleged) terrorist acts, reminders of 9-11, and sympathy for victims. The Administration cautioned media against videos purporting to come from Bin Laden, until in December the Pentagon released (by definition, an act of war propaganda) a grainy video of uncertain provenance, in which (in Arabic) Bin Laden might (but might not) have demonstrated approving foreknowledge of 9-11. Bin Laden is heard telling followers about calculations to hit a tower, but there was no direct claim of responsibility. The release of three videos from Al-Jazeera in September 2002 attracted similar doubts. The videos showed some of the 9-11 hijackers, and one contained what the broadcaster said was the voice of Bin Laden claiming direct responsibility. Egyptian analysts, quoted in a Financial Times story (Drummond, 2002), were skeptical about the crude editing of the tapes, the timing of their release, and Al-Jazeera’s silence about how it had obtained the videos. Even by September 2002,

Authors: Boyd-Barrett, J..
first   previous   Page 11 of 33   next   last



background image
Doubt Foreclosed
10
Susan Sontag) critical of presidential behavior on day one, including lackluster public addresses. The
White House seemingly lied in calling Bush 9-11 movements a response to a “credible security threat”
(White, 2001). War fever was facilitated by media dependence on government, military and security
service “experts.” The role of Vice-President Dick Cheney was obscured, prompting discussion as to the
locus of Administration power. Until May 2002 nobody recalled how Bush had entrusted Cheney in May
2001 with national coordination of responses to domestic terror attacks (Rich, 2002, A15).
Vilification of Culprit
Through media, the Administration simplistically vilified as culprit one man and his organization – a vital
requirement of war propaganda. However much Osama bin Laden’s culpability may seem incontrovertible
from this distance of time, it was far less so in the weeks and months immediately following 9-11.
Vilification, as justification to attack Afghanistan, was achieved without adequate disclosure of evidence.
(A complex relationship between Bin Laden and the CIA has been suggested by Martin, June 6, 2002; Bin
Laden had once worked for the General Intelligence Department of the Saudi secret service and is said by
Brisard and Dasquie, 2001, to have been a close confidante of Prince Turki, who was head of Saudi
intelligence up to a short time prior to 9-11). Disclosed evidence explicitly disclaimed judicial standard.
“This document” the dossier began, “does not purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama bin
Laden in a court of law” (Hersh, 2001; Marsden and Grey, 2001). The media case against Bin Laden was
mostly assertive and indirect, including retellings of previous (alleged) terrorist acts, reminders of 9-11, and
sympathy for victims. The Administration cautioned media against videos purporting to come from Bin
Laden, until in December the Pentagon released (by definition, an act of war propaganda) a grainy video of
uncertain provenance, in which (in Arabic) Bin Laden might (but might not) have demonstrated approving
foreknowledge of 9-11. Bin Laden is heard telling followers about calculations to hit a tower, but there
was no direct claim of responsibility. The release of three videos from Al-Jazeera in September 2002
attracted similar doubts. The videos showed some of the 9-11 hijackers, and one contained what the
broadcaster said was the voice of Bin Laden claiming direct responsibility. Egyptian analysts, quoted in a
Financial Times story (Drummond, 2002), were skeptical about the crude editing of the tapes, the timing of
their release, and Al-Jazeera’s silence about how it had obtained the videos. Even by September 2002,


Convention
Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.
Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!
Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!
Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

first   previous   Page 11 of 33   next   last

©2012 All Academic, Inc.