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proof should be loosened in such a way as to allow submission of concrete circumstances that would
support the doubts raised and subjective judgment on the ideology.
The Supreme Court said that establishing the requisite concrete circumstance to reach a judgment
on their political ideology is through presenting the political statements and activities in which the public
figure or organization has been engaged. The Court continued: “To document their political positions and
activities, the news reports of the publicly recognized news media can be an important source material,
and this includes the publicly known facts or the facts obvious to the court.”
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But the Supreme Court
held that “malicious defamation with no foundation on concrete circumstances” is not acceptable even
where it involves a public figure relating to his public matters. Moreover, the Court refused to protect
insulting expression about public figures regardless of whether the defamatory statement is based on
concrete circumstances.
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In U.S. libel law, the most unwavering rule is that no defamation is subject to injunctive relief.
The absoluteness of the rule, according to Judge Robert D. Sack of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
"forecloses the possibility of frequent lawsuits based upon a person's suspicion or fear that adverse
commentary is about to be published." He added that "a more flexible rule would encourage inadequate
reporting in an effort to keep knowledge of an impending derogatory article away from potential
plaintiffs, thereby avoiding litigation."
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In Korea, however, injunction is recognized in libel law. The Supreme Court held that prevention
of injurious behavior is recognized as equity in libel law because monetary compensation awards or
criminal punishment is not sufficient for complete recovery from reputational injury after defamation has
already been inflicted. The Court follows the widely recognized precept of libel law that one's reputation
cannot be recovered easily once it is taken away.
In enjoining libels, however, Korean courts thus far have failed to establish a set of criteria which
most likely will ameliorate the “freezing” impact of prior restraint on freedom of the press. The courts
seem more interested in results than in doctrine, and many court opinions turned on specific facts
involved rather than adopting any general rule on injunctions in libel law.
While injunctions are recognized as a constitutional prior restraint on libel in Korea, the
Constitution prohibits publication of apology as a "suitable" measure for restoring the reputation of the
injured under Article 764 of the Civil Code. The Constitutional Court in 1991 ruled that the Civil Code
Convention