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judges to resolve unsettled or novel questions relating to the still evolving libel law in Korea. More often,
it is invoked by Korean lawyers in an effort to offer an alternative interpretation of the libel law, if not to
change the law by wholesale.
Nevertheless, the impact of American law on Korea’s libel law is expected to continue to grow in
the future. One explanation for Korean courts’ increasing reliance on American law is that a surprisingly
number of disputes involving the Korean press are strikingly similar to many American court decisions in
their factual and legal issues. The dearth of legal theories and tests for freedom of expression in Korean
law forces Korean jurists to turn to the U.S. law for relevant guidance and direction.
Law professor Rodney A. Smolla of the University of Richmond is correct in discussing why
American free-speech law is useful beyond U.S. borders:
The American experience with freedom of speech is important to the rest of the world not
because our current First Amendment policies are necessarily wise--it is not that
Americans have all the perplexing issues of free speech “right.” American thinking on
freedom of speech is relevant to the rest of the world because our experience in wrestling
with free speech conflicts and communications policy is unusually rich. American
society may not have the best answers, but it has thought about the problems more.
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A cautionary note on Korean courts' possible adoption of American law is in order, however. It is
presumptive that Korean courts will embrace major First Amendment principles of American law in the
immediate future. Instead of accepting American law across the board, Korean judges will be selective in
experimenting with compatible U.S. law in adjudicating various media cases. The public-figure standard
of U.S. libel law, for example, will be likely to draw systematic attention from Korean courts in the years
ahead. This is predictable especially when the libel plaintiff is prominent and influential enough to affect
the sociopolitical agenda of Korea and the story complained of deals with a matter of public concern.
It is incorrect reading of American libel law to assume, however, that Korean courts' eventual
adoption of the public-figure rule would be a radical departure from the sociocultural and political norms
reflected in Korean libel law. Indeed, the public-figure doctrine in and of itself is more restrictive
conceptually than the "matter of public interest" standard of Korean libel law, if "actual malice" is not
taken into account. When the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 retrenched from its matters of public interest
to its public-figure rule under the “actual malice” doctrine, it worried about the amorphous notion of
"public interest" as a useful standard.
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According to a 1998 study of Korean libel law, the notion of "public figure" has not been a
Convention