9
Hong case in that "[t]he public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around
sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without assuming
responsibility for them."
46
This bears a close nexus with the "public interest" justification for defamation
in Korean libel law. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Korea looked into the "public interest" defense for
libel in the news media’s crime reporting.
The
Dong-A Ilbo and other news organizations reported in August 1990 that an arrest warrant
was requested for Yu Myong-ja for allegedly hiring gang members for attack on her former husband to
extort alimony. The news story was based on information from a police detective investigating Yu and
others. Eventually Yu was found innocent. Nevertheless, Yu and those mentioned in the 1990 news
story filed suit against the Dong-A Ilbo and other media for libel.
The news media appealed the Seoul High Court’s ruling, which affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
47
The media argued that they did not have to account for reporting on Yu and others because
the arrest warrant requested was "a matter of public interest" and that they had "a proper reason for
believing the inaccurate information." The Supreme Court adopted an "ad-hoc balancing," i.e., case-by-
case, approach
48
in accommodating press freedom in conflict with protection of reputation and privacy:
A democratic nation maintains its political order by collecting the majoritarian
views through a free flow of public opinion. Thus, freedom of expression especially
relating to matters of public interest should be protected to the maximum possible extent
as an important constitutional right. No less significant, however, is the protection of
such personal interests as individual reputation and privacy. When a person’s reputation
as a right of personality conflicts with freedom of the press, the balancing of interests
should determine the extent and method of the regulation used in the specific case by
weighing the benefit from free press against that from the protection of reputation.
49
From this perspective, the Court ruled that "it is not a violation of the Civil Code [for a
newspaper] to defame a person if the story deals with a matter of public interest and is true and only for
the public benefit." The Court further held that although there was no proof of the story’s truth, no
unlawful act was committed when the newspaper defendant had a considerable reason to believe that the
story was true.
50
Refusing to adopt the "definitional balancing" method,
51
the Court opinion stated that
whether a defamatory statement concerns a "matter of public interest" must be determined by considering
the specific contents of the statement, the context of the statement’s publication relating to the plaintiff,
and the publishing method of the statement, along with the reputational injury the person suffered from
the statement.
52
Convention