Author's Keywords: nuclear south asia, US-India nuclear agreement, off-shore balancing, Manmohan Singh, George W. Bush	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Rudolph, Lloyd. "Making US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Off-shore Balancing in Historical Perspective" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150429_index.html>

Rudolph, L. I. , 2006-08-31 "Making US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Off-shore Balancing in Historical Perspective" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150429_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: I would like to conclude this analysis of �Making US Foreign Policy for a Nuclear South Asia: Off-shore Balancing in Historical Perspective� by considering the question, �What does it mean to be a �great power�? in the context of the Bush administration�s efforts to transform US � India relations. I start with the thought that the US is labeled a superpower. It is said to be the only one, the sole superpower. Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China are, by a consensus of sorts, the five great powers. India aspires to be a great power. The US has told India that an important aspect of the nuclear deal it is offering to India is US willingness to recognize India as a great power. The choice before great powers in today�s uni-polar world seems to be whether to bandwagon with the sole superpower, the US, or to balance against it. In the face of the Bush administration�s doctrines of unilaterialism and pre-emptive war, it is not likely that balancing against the super-power can prevent it from going to war when it is not over-committed. But when it is over-committed, as is the case in mid-August 2006, balancing against the super-power as Russia and China seem to be doing with respect to the possibility of a US attack on a Iran, can be effective. The five great powers have are thought to be great because they have robust economies, ranking second [Japan], third [Germany], fourth [Britain], fifth [France] and sixth [China] behind the US, that enable them to be relatively economic independent and because they have nuclear weapons or have the protection of nuclear weapons. The question before is, how credible is the US claim that the nuclear agreement it is offering India will make it a great power? A lot turns on the question of nuclear sovereignty. For India nuclear sovereignty operationally means the capability and the right to determine and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Under the NPT there are five and only five states who, by treaty, possess nuclear sovereignty: The US, Britain, France, Russia and China, the five country which, by 1968 when the treaty became operational, had developed and tested nuclear weapons. India was not among them, It first tested in 1974 and, as a result, was classified as non-nuclear weapons state, a state that lacked nuclear sovereignty. Japan and Germany, two of the great powers, rely for nuclear protection on a US nuclear umbrella; it gives them freedom from what K. Subrahmanyam, a leading Indian security intellectual, calls �the power of intimidation.� Lacking nuclear sovereignty, Japan and Germany, Japan more clearly than Germany, are prone to bandwagon with the US. Russia and China, states that are nuclear sovereign, can and do balance against the US. Britain historically and more intensively during the nine plus years that Tony Blair has been Prime Minister, has bandwagonned with the US, more so during George Bush�s than during Bill Clinton�s presidency. The costs, it seems to me have outweighed the benefits. Blair�s Britain has had to share the enmity that the US has generated in the Muslim world and the marginal but increasing alienation of its Muslim citizens and that alienation�s potential for generating terrorist violence. Can India be a �great power� given the need for a great power to have a robust and relatively independent economy and to possess nuclear sovereignty? The simple answer to the economy question is yes. The answer to the nuclear sovereignty question is maybe. Much depends on the outcome of the negotiations between the US and India on the question. At this stage, those negotiations depend in both cases on how the deliberative process in the two countries� respective legislatures [and parties and public opinion] turn out. As we have seen, the Manmohan Singh UPA government has taken the view that India can not command nuclear sovereignty, i. e. the capability to create and maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent, if it doesn�t share key rights that nuclear sovereign NPT states possess. These include the right to shift nuclear installations from civilian to military and back; the right to test unless and until all nuclear sovereign states agree not to test; the right to make fissile fuel unless and until all nuclear sovereign states enter into an agreement to stop producing fissile fuel.. Assuming India signs a nuclear agreement with the US that limits India�s nuclear sovereignty, an agreement that results in India resembling a non-nuclear more than a nuclear weapons state, what kind of great power is it likely to be ? It is likely to be a great power like Japan and Germany, for the most part in a bandwagon relationship to the sole superpower, the US. Assuming India�s nuclear agreement with the US results in India acquiring the rights of an NPT nuclear weapons state, would India be a great power more like Russia, China and France or more like Britain? There are those in India who would continue to favor bandwagonning with the US. Its defense agreement and tentative nuclear agreement with the US indicate that India has been trying out such a relationship. The consequences so far of bandwagonning with the US appear to be like those experienced by the Blair government, growing enmity on the part of Muslim states, alienation of its Muslim citizens and terrorist violence. Uday Bhaskar, director of Delhi�s Institute of Defense Studies, doesn�t think �that India has the DNA to allow it to become a Japan or a Britain in terms of adopting a subordinate status to the U. S. and allowing them to guarantee the nation�s security. India�s strategic culture would not allow it.� If it does achieve nuclear sovereignty, it is likely to be a great power more like Russia, China and France, able and sometimes willing to balance against the US, but more willing than they are to bandwagon with US. At the same time, India is likely to pursue a strategy that might be called neo-non-alignment, staking out positions that mobilize the possibilities of a multi-polar world of lesser and greater states free to act independently of the sole super-power.

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