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Making US Foreign Policy for South Asia: Off-shore Balancing in Historical Perspective
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Tellis was trying to persuade India to join Pakistan as an ally
of the US, the world’s only super-power.
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In the language of
Stephen Walt, India was being asked to bandwagon
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with the US,
i. e. to gain the benefits and prestige that go with joining the most
powerful and, putatively, the winning side. But there is another grand strategy, one that a significant number of Indian policy
makers are entertaining, for India to balance against what they perceive to be a unilateralist and imperial US. They fear that the
May 2005.” http://
www.carneigieendowment.org/files/PB38.pdf
. The
warrants for Tellis’ assertion here is “senior officials” who “revealed through a background briefing on the day [March 25, 2005]… of the president’s phone call [about the sale of F-16s to Pakistan] to [India’s Prime Minister Dr Manmohan] …Singh, that the United States had in fact reached the decision to ‘help India become a major power in the twenty-first century.’” [emphasis supplied] Tellis, “South Asia Seesaw,” p. 1.
28
.
Here is how Ashley Tellis put the US position: The Bush
administration believes it can preserve “good relations with both India and Pakistan simultaneously” despite its decision to resume the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan, “because of the conviction that both countries represent different kinds of strategic opportunities for the United States; as Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice put it, ‘India … is looking to grow its influence into a global influence … and Pakistan … is looking to a settled neighborhood so that it can deal with extremism inside its own border.” Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw,” p. 1-2. Here, Tellis is presenting the scripts that the US expects India and Pakistan to follow.
29
.
For the concept of bandwagoning and its use see Stephen Walt,
Revolution and War [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. Walt used the concept in a preliminary way in Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987. John Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, W. W. Norton, 2001, discounts the concept in the context of his theory of “offensive realism” when he argues that great powers rarely bandwagon and that minor powers sometimes do so because “they have no other choice.” Neither Walt nor Mearsheimer use the concept in the ordinary language meaning used here, joining what is perceived to be the winning side in a struggle for world power.
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Tellis was trying to persuade India to join Pakistan as an ally
of the US, the world’s only super-power.
Stephen Walt, India was being asked to bandwagon
i. e. to gain the benefits and prestige that go with joining the most
powerful and, putatively, the winning side. But there is another
grand strategy, one that a significant number of Indian policy
makers are entertaining, for India to balance against what they
perceive to be a unilateralist and imperial US. They fear that the
May 2005.” http://
warrants for Tellis’ assertion here is “senior officials” who “revealed
through a background briefing on the day [March 25, 2005]… of the
president’s phone call [about the sale of F-16s to Pakistan] to [India’s Prime
Minister Dr Manmohan] …Singh, that the United States had in fact reached
the decision to ‘help India become a major power in the twenty-first
century.’” [emphasis supplied] Tellis, “South Asia Seesaw,” p. 1.
28
.
Here is how Ashley Tellis put the US position: The Bush
administration believes it can preserve “good relations with both India and
Pakistan simultaneously” despite its decision to resume the sale of F-16
fighter aircraft to Pakistan, “because of the conviction that both countries
represent different kinds of strategic opportunities for the United States; as
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice put it, ‘India … is looking to grow its
influence into a global influence … and Pakistan … is looking to a settled
neighborhood so that it can deal with extremism inside its own border.”
Tellis, “South Asian Seesaw,” p. 1-2. Here, Tellis is presenting the scripts
that the US expects India and Pakistan to follow.
29
.
For the concept of bandwagoning and its use see Stephen Walt,
Revolution and War [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. Walt used
the concept in a preliminary way in Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 1987. John Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, New York, W. W. Norton, 2001, discounts the concept in the
context of his theory of “offensive realism” when he argues that great
powers rarely bandwagon and that minor powers sometimes do so because
“they have no other choice.” Neither Walt nor Mearsheimer use the concept
in the ordinary language meaning used here, joining what is perceived to be
the winning side in a struggle for world power.
19
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