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If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? --Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy towards China
Unformatted Document Text:  Zanger Committee on nuclear export control by using Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit to Washington as a negotiation leverage. As Winston Lord said, China’s Zanger Committee membership facilitated U.S.-China cooperation with regard to the North Korean nuclear crisis in the late 1990s. 38 The reason for China’s compromise on U.S. soft-balancing efforts is straightforward. The Chinese leaders are aware that a good and healthy U.S.-China relationship is vital for its modernization program, because the U.S. market and technology are two indispensable factors for China’s economic growth. Although China aspired to increase its political and military influence/power in the Middle East, its power disparity with the U.S. constrained the expansion of Chinese strategic interests beyond its territory. China faced a strategic choice between its economic development and military influence associated with its proliferation policy in the Middle East. Apparently, China compromised the latter for pursuing the former. However, China’s concession to the U.S. on the proliferation issue is also guided by its national security. Despite U.S. pressures and international regime constraints, China continued its technological support and military cooperation with Pakistan in the 1990s because of Pakistan’s strategic importance to China’s security. In addition, China-Pakistan missile programs were also seen as a counter-balancing measure against U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, which directly threatened China’s vital security interests. 39 Taiwan. U.S. Taiwan policy after the cold war is another example of U.S. soft balancing against China. During the cold war, U.S.-China rapprochement and later strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union were built at the cost of Taiwan. The U.S. 38 See Nancy Tucker, ed. China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations (1945-1996) (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2001),p.469 39 See Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” p.193. 29

Authors: Feng, Huiyun. and He, Kai.
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Zanger Committee on nuclear export control by using Jiang Zemin’s 1997 visit to
Washington as a negotiation leverage. As Winston Lord said, China’s Zanger Committee
membership facilitated U.S.-China cooperation with regard to the North Korean nuclear
The reason for China’s compromise on U.S. soft-balancing efforts is straightforward.
The Chinese leaders are aware that a good and healthy U.S.-China relationship is vital for
its modernization program, because the U.S. market and technology are two
indispensable factors for China’s economic growth. Although China aspired to increase
its political and military influence/power in the Middle East, its power disparity with the
U.S. constrained the expansion of Chinese strategic interests beyond its territory. China
faced a strategic choice between its economic development and military influence
associated with its proliferation policy in the Middle East. Apparently, China
compromised the latter for pursuing the former. However, China’s concession to the U.S.
on the proliferation issue is also guided by its national security. Despite U.S. pressures
and international regime constraints, China continued its technological support and
military cooperation with Pakistan in the 1990s because of Pakistan’s strategic
importance to China’s security. In addition, China-Pakistan missile programs were also
seen as a counter-balancing measure against U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan, which
directly threatened China’s vital security interests.
Taiwan. U.S. Taiwan policy after the cold war is another example of U.S. soft
balancing against China. During the cold war, U.S.-China rapprochement and later
strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union were built at the cost of Taiwan. The U.S.
38
See Nancy Tucker, ed. China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations (1945-1996) (N.Y.:
Columbia University Press, 2001),p.469
39
See Ross, “Engagement in U.S. China Policy,” p.193.
29


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