In this paper we examine the validity of anti-soft-balancing arguments and refine
the current soft-balancing theory. It posits that current criticisms of soft balancing are
helpful intellectually, but to ignore and deny the existence of soft balancing is
theoretically misleading and analytically problematic. First, if balancing (including soft
balancing) is not a valid behavior under unipolarity, then should we expect all states to
bandwagon? Apparently, critics of soft balancing agree that other states do not always
follow the U.S. lead under the unipolar world. However, they fail to theoretically
describe and explain these reoccurring and unfavorable behaviors towards the U.S.
Second, some alternative explanations suggested by the critics to refute soft balancing, by
renaming it as clashing economic interests, policy disputes, and diplomatic frictions,
further confuse the concepts of strategies and tactics. Soft-balancing arguments can
subsume most of the alternative arguments from a strategic perspective.
In addition, we suggest that the current soft-balancing argument is ad hoc in
nature and needs further conceptual and theoretical scrutiny. We argue that soft balancing
is not a unique behavior under unipolarity as most soft-balancing theorists suggest.
Rather, it is a rational state behavior shaped by two systemic variables—power disparity
and economic dependence among states. While hard balancing aims at increasing the
relative power of a state against a powerful and threatening state through domestic
military buildups and external alignments, soft balancing focuses on undermining the
relative power of the strong and threatening state through non-military coordination
among other states in bilateral and multilateral arenas. While the anarchic international
system inclines states toward choosing balancing for security, the deepening economic
International Security vol. 30, no. 1 (2005), pp. 109-39. For an academic exchange over pros and cons of soft balancing
arguments, see Robert Art, Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, Keir Lieber, and Gerard Alexander, “Correspondence:
Striking the Balance,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2006), pp. 177-96.
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