Author's Keywords: lobbying, contributions, information, parties, health	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150461_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Hall, Richard. and Van Houweling, Robert. "Campaign Contributions and Lobbying on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2011-03-13 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150461_index.html>

Hall, R. L. and Van Houweling, R. , 2006-08-31 "Campaign Contributions and Lobbying on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2011-03-13 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p150461_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: The occasional bribery scandal not withstanding, the impact of private money in congressional politics is more often sensationally asserted than empirically established. While there remain dissenting voices, after three decades of research the vote-buying hypothesis can probably be put to rest. If money matters, it matters in less visible, perhaps more insidious ways, with the main mechanism of influence operating through the even larger sums that groups and firms spend on lobbying. A growing literature both theoretical and empirical has examined the mechanisms by which lobbying may influence legislators. We join that scholarship by embedding our hypotheses about money’s effects in a subsidy theory of lobbying. We proceed empirically by analyzing a rich dataset on the access of lobbyists to individual senators in the drafting, debate, and disposition of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderization Act of 2003 (MMA). Because the MMA was passed before the existing ban on “soft money” took effect, we can examine not only the effects of donations by PACs to individual senators but also the indirect effects of the often more substantial donations by groups and firms to party committees. This allows a first assessment of what benefits, if any, donors receive when they fill party coffers, and, more generally, what influence party fundraising has on the legislative process. Our findings offer strong support for the hypotheses that hard money bought access to senators during deliberations over the MMA, weaker support for the value of soft money to lobbyists.

The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Content and Passage of Legislation: Modeling Effects of Campaign Costs, Partisan Strength and Institutional Design in State Legislative Chambers

Why Pay for a Free Show? Modeling Legislators` Decisions to Grant Access and Interest Groups` Decisions to Contribute