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Campaign Contributions and Lobbying on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
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Campaign Contributions and Lobbying on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
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Richard L. Hall
University of Michigan
Robert P. Van Houweling
University of California at Berkeley
Prepared for delivery at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, May
30-September 3, 2006. Philadelphia, PA.
Abstract
The occasional bribery scandal not withstanding, the impact of private money in
congressional politics is more often sensationally asserted than empirically established. While there remain dissenting voices, after three decades of research the vote-buying hypothesis can probably be put to rest. If money matters, it matters in less visible, perhaps more insidious ways, with the main mechanism of influence operating through the even larger sums that groups and firms spend on lobbying.
One way in which campaign contributions may matter, in fact, is that they buy “access”
for the lobbyists of PAC-affiliated organizations. In the decade prior to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, in turn, this assertion was broadened to incorporate the allegedly corrupting influence of soft money as well as hard. Over the last 20 years, a growing literature both theoretical and empirical has examined the mechanisms by which lobbying may influence legislators. We join that scholarship theoretically by embedding our hypotheses about money’s effects in a theory of lobbying adapted from Hall and Deardorff (2006). We join the scholarship empirically by analyzing a rich dataset on the access of lobbyists to individual senators in the drafting, debate, and disposition of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Moderization Act of 2003 (MMA). Because the MMA was passed before the existing ban on “soft money” took effect, we can examine not only the effects of donations by PACs to individual senators but also the indirect effects of the often more substantial donations by groups and firms to party committees. This allows a first assessment of what benefits, if any, donors receive when they fill party coffers, and, more generally, what influence party fundraising has on the legislative process. Our findings offer strong support for the hypotheses that hard money bought access to senators during deliberations over the MMA, weaker support for the value of soft money to lobbyists.
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We thank Ryan Rembrandt and Andrew Kelly for valuable research assistance and to John
Dinardo for methodological assistance. Hall gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Investigator Award program. Van Houweling gratefully acknowledges the support of the Robert Wood Johnson Scholars in Health Policy Program.
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| | Authors: Hall, Richard. and Van Houweling, Robert. |
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Campaign Contributions and Lobbying on the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
Richard L. Hall
University of Michigan
Robert P. Van Houweling
University of California at Berkeley
Prepared for delivery at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, May
30-September 3, 2006. Philadelphia, PA.
Abstract
The occasional bribery scandal not withstanding, the impact of private money in
congressional politics is more often sensationally asserted than empirically established. While
there remain dissenting voices, after three decades of research the vote-buying hypothesis can
probably be put to rest. If money matters, it matters in less visible, perhaps more insidious ways,
with the main mechanism of influence operating through the even larger sums that groups and
firms spend on lobbying.
One way in which campaign contributions may matter, in fact, is that they buy “access”
for the lobbyists of PAC-affiliated organizations. In the decade prior to the Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act, in turn, this assertion was broadened to incorporate the allegedly corrupting
influence of soft money as well as hard. Over the last 20 years, a growing literature both
theoretical and empirical has examined the mechanisms by which lobbying may influence
legislators. We join that scholarship theoretically by embedding our hypotheses about money’s
effects in a theory of lobbying adapted from Hall and Deardorff (2006). We join the scholarship
empirically by analyzing a rich dataset on the access of lobbyists to individual senators in the
drafting, debate, and disposition of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Moderization Act of 2003 (MMA). Because the MMA was passed before the existing ban on
“soft money” took effect, we can examine not only the effects of donations by PACs to individual
senators but also the indirect effects of the often more substantial donations by groups and firms
to party committees. This allows a first assessment of what benefits, if any, donors receive when
they fill party coffers, and, more generally, what influence party fundraising has on the legislative
process. Our findings offer strong support for the hypotheses that hard money bought access to
senators during deliberations over the MMA, weaker support for the value of soft money to
lobbyists.
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We thank Ryan Rembrandt and Andrew Kelly for valuable research assistance and to John
Dinardo for methodological assistance. Hall gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science
Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Investigator Award program. Van Houweling gratefully
acknowledges the support of the Robert Wood Johnson Scholars in Health Policy Program.
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