adopted of generality, universality, ordering, publicity and finality,
as well as three substantive conditions. First, the imposition of the
veil of ignorance in the original position ensures the fairness of the
deliberative process--persons are represented as equal moral persons,
and none are "advantaged or disadvantaged by the contingencies of
their social position" (316). Second, deliberations within the
original position are to focus on background justice. The parties
must adopt the "perspective required for considering the justice of
the basic structure itself" (337). This perspective requires that
first principles must be justified in terms of "the features of
persons relevant for the justice of the basic structure" (337). That
is, a focus on background justice forces the parties to choose
principles that can be justified as necessary and appropriate to
establish the fairness of the institutions within which cooperation
for mutual benefit is to occur. Finally, the parties are situated
symmetrically with respect to each other. No person is viewed as
possessing a claim to exercise superior influence upon the output of
the deliberations.
Rawls notes that the reasonable, as modeled by the original
position, subordinates the rational.
The constraints upon
deliberation--the veil of ignorance, the focus on background justice,
and the formal conditions on principles, and the symmetrical position
of the parties--limit absolutely the rational ends that the parties
may attempt to further. This feature of the decision procedure, Rawls
argues, represents the Kantian view that the reasonable presupposes
and subordinates the rational.
Freedom. Three features of the original position represent the
freedom of moral persons. First, the claims of all persons in
original position deliberations carry weight without any demonstration
that such claims can be derived from prior rights or obligations.
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Convention