Introduction
Liberalism is often criticized for championing a thin theory human nature (see
Sandel: 1982; Walzer: 1994). Seeking a common ground from which to think about such
issues as individual rights and autonomy, rule of law, constitutionalism, limited
government, free markets, and toleration, liberals often ground their theory in a
minimalist set of assumptions about human nature. For example, Benthamite
utilitarianism views the individual as a pleasure-seeking creature motivated by a desire to
maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Kantianism rests upon the view of the individual
as an abstract rights-bearing subject whose freedom rests upon its autonomy from other
such subjects. Rawlsian liberalism is predicated on a rational rights-bearing subject who
is freed from any particular notion of the good.
Although a thin theory of human nature may lie at the heart of much liberal
theory, a few prominent theorists in the liberal tradition reject a thin theory of human
nature, offering in its place a robust or thick theory of the individual as the foundation for
understanding how people relate together in society and for thinking about politics. Thick
theories focus on the particularism and complexity that define individuals and their
relationships to others in political society. Their understanding and defense of liberal
institutions and values are derived directly from these thick theories of the nature of the
individual in society. Such is the case of Adam Smith.
Commentators interested in Smith’s place in the founding of modern economic
science often attribute a thin theory of human nature to Smith.
is seen as defining the individual actor in the Wealth of Nations is a general desire “to
better one’s own condition.” Lying behind this desire is the idea of a rational utility
1
See, for example, Schumpeter (1954), Blaug (1996),and Hollander (1973).
2
Convention