Smith begins his inquiry into the logic of self-command in Section III of Part VI
by separating the passions into two categories: passions such as fear and anger that
require a great deal of self-command to control, and those such as the love of ease, of
pleasure, and of applause that are easy to control in any one particular instance but may
be one difficult to control over a lifetime.
This distinction enables him to investigate
the factors in human nature that drive an individual away from self-command as well as
those that attract him to it. It also provides a framework for thinking about how the lesser
virtues ─ the virtues other than prudence, justice, beneficence ─ fit into the life of the
individual.
Smith sees the passions of fear and anger as driving people forcefully away from
their duties in society as well as from the moral dictates of their own consciences (i.e. the
conclusions of the impartial spectator). They incapacitate us, making it difficult to act in
any way other than in response to their demands. Command over these desires demands
fortitude, manhood, or strength of mind.
A second set of passions ─ including ease,
pleasure, applause, and other selfish gratifications ─ “seduce us” away from self-
command, continually making small demands upon us until they overwhelm us in times
of weakness. Command of these passions encompasses another set of virtues:
temperance, decency, modesty, and moderation (TMS: 238).
These two sets of virtues, in turn, are linked to desires that arise in the mind after
perceiving virtue. These desires are capable of motivating people to additional acts of
virtue. For example, Smith notes that people naturally approve of and are attracted to the
20
The distinction is one that he notes was made by the ancients. After adopting it, he uses it for his own
purposes.
21
It is curious that Smith does not refer to “courage” in this list. From the text, it is not completely clear if
Smith leaves it off the list because he is simply summarizing the opinions of “ancient moralists” or he
actually wants to keep courage off the list of the characteristics that describe self-command of these
passions. Given that the term “courage” is used favorably throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments and
the discussion in Part VI, I believe that he does not use it here because he is summarizing the opinion of the
ancient moralists.
29
Convention