in Part VI, and is, I believe, an essential element of the thick view of the individual that
he develops in Part VI of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. To understand his argument in
support of this claim, we must briefly review additional material outside Part VI that
appears for the first time in the 6
th
edition: the theory of the natural development of a
child’s moral sentiments.
Part III of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in the extensively revised 6
th
edition
contains a discussion of duty and conscience. There Smith offers a natural history
explanation of how moral judgment begins to develop in a child and culminates in the
formation of a moral conscience. At first, moral judgment in children is based upon their
assessment of how the characters and conduct of others affect them. If they do good to us,
we assess them positively; if, they do bad, negatively. Children soon learn that others are
making similar judgments about their character and conduct. Out of children’s natural
desire to have others make favorable judgments about their character and conduct, two
new desires arises. The first is an anxiety to know how they appear in the eyes of others.
Smith refers to this as the desire for praise. The second is a separate, but not unrelated,
anxiety as to whether or not we deserve their censure or applause. This is the desire to be
praiseworthy. The first anxiety leads children to develop rules about how to attain the
positive judgment of others in society and to source of the rules of duty; the second leads
children to begin to cultivate a moral conscience and to develop the capacity to view
oneself form the position of the impartial spectator (see TMS: 111-13).
A sharp tension between the desire to be praised and the desire to be praiseworthy
runs throughout Part III. In early editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith
6
The idea of the impartial spectator lies at the heart of Smith’s theory of moral judgment and is the basis by
which individuals come to make judgments about their own behavior and character. For a further
discussion of this complex concept see Harpham (200, 2001). See also Griswold (1999), Evensky (2005),
Otteson (2002), Fleishchacker (1999), MacFie (1967), Campbell (1971), Lindgren (1973), Raphael (1973),
and Montes (2004)..
9
Convention