I. The Problem of Collective Action
Most of the collective action literature focuses on the problem of cooperation that arises
in the presence of collective goods. Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action was
particularly influential in defining the problem for contemporary political science.
work drew on the theory of public goods as developed by Samuelson, but applied it to a
much larger domain since “the achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of
any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided.” Olson
was enormously influential in part because he so effectively debunked prevailing pluralist
theories of group politics, which held that groups existed because they shared interests.
As Olson demonstrated, the existence of a common interest is not sufficient for collective
action to occur, because each individual will have an incentive not to cooperate but rather
to defect or “free ride,” to enjoy the benefits without bearing any costs. The focus on
cooperation, however, has tended to obscure two other obstacles to collective action that
can be equally important. One is the problem of coordination when there is more than
one way to cooperate. The other, even more fundamental, is the problem of establishing
a common interest in a collective good.
Collective Goods and the Problem of Cooperation
A problem of collective action arises in the presence of collective goods, which, broadly
speaking, are those goods which if provided for one must be provided for all.
problem can be seen clearly if modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
is by now quite familiar, defection is the dominant strategy, and mutual defection is in
equilibrium. Other situations involving more than two parties can be modeled as a
multi-party dilemma with the same essential logic.
As Olson showed, the difficulty of collective action increases as groups get larger. A
consequence, therefore, is the familiar asymmetry between diffuse general interests, of
2
Olson, 1965.
3
Samuelson, 1954. These characteristics are known as jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion.
4
First discovered by Dresher and Tucker and given its classic form by Luce and Raiffa, 1957.
3
Convention